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Digital advertising is the de facto primary way to monetize the entire Internet. For
example, over 85% of annual revenue for two prestigious tech companies, Google and
Facebook, is generated through digital advertising. It is for this reason that, these and
other such companies are able to continually drive the evolutions of information technology
in ways that serve to enhance our everyday lives. The undeniable benefits include free
web browsers with powerful search engines and mobile applications. Still, it turns out
that “free” does have a cost, and we pay for it through our interactions within a digital
advertising ecosystem. However, such digital advertisements, along with the underlying
systems, suffer from various security and privacy related issues.
This dissertation aims to improve security in digital advertising ecosystems. Therefore,
we conduct a comprehensive study on both security and privacy related topics. First, after
collecting over 84K mobile ads, we reveal the correlation between click fraud and malver-
tising, and suggest that ad networks should take more responsibility to mitigate not only
malvertising but also click fraud. In addition, our case studies show an emerging trend in
security threats with cryptojacking. Second, based on the nature of current monetization
services, we present In-App AdPay, which allows users to query targeted ads by granting
permissions at different levels, and receives credits for ad views/clicks. Afterwards, we de-
duce the association between users’ private information and advertisers’ virtual payments,
including how users value permissions in different test scenarios. Finally, we also point out
other ad-related threats (i.e., ad revenue stealing attack, and ad inappropriateness) occurred




Everyday, when people engjoy payless services (e.g., web surfing, information searching,
and app gaming), they may barely think about how service providers (e.g., Google, and
Facebook) offer all these services for free. In fact, a large number of the world’s most well-
known IT companies derive their primary revenue through digital advertising. In 2017, over
85% of annual revenue for the above listed enterprises is generated through advertising.
For this reason, these IT giants are able to continuously drive the evolutions of information
technology. However, “free” comes at a cost that is paid through people’s interactions
within digital advertising ecosystems, which rely on different parties (i.e., advertisers, ad
networks, publishers, and users). Here we use a similar naming convention for different
environments, as shown in Table 1.1.
Furthermore, recent IAB reports [1] showed that Internet advertising revenues in the
United States has grown from $26B in 2010 to $88B in 2017. While digital advertising
has been attracting the attention from advertisers, ad networks, and publishers, it has also
drawn the attention from miscreants. They have been engaged with a variety of malicious
activities (e.g., click fraud, and malvertising). For example, ad fraudsters utilized Methobot
to make $3-5M per day by triggering fake clicks on 300M ads with bots [2]. YouTube fixed
a vulnerability that allows advertisers to steal victims’ computing power for mining cryp-
tocurrency throught malicious ads [3]. Also, over 87M Facebook users’ private data were
breached by Cambridge Analytica for political advertising [4]. Meanwhile, 14 controver-
Table 1.1: Naming conventions in digital advertising
Online Advertising Mobile Advertising
Ad Network Ad Library
Publisher App Developer
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sial ads used for propagandizing election-related content were found on Facebook [5]. Such
practices could be found on the news occasionally several years ago, but occur in clusters
right now. Clearly, there is an immediate need to study and address these issues in digital
advertising.
1.1 Overview
In the context of digital advertising, while advertisers sit on the one end to provide ad funds
for spreading out ad-related content, publishers sit on the other end to provide free content
for ad spaces. While it is possible for a few large advertisers to directly negotiate with a
few large publishers as has been done with traditionally billboards and paper media, this
direct collaboration is not suitable for the vast number of publishers and advertisers on
the Internet. Nowadays, a large amount of publishers monetize their “free” contents by
providing ad spaces for a large amount of advertisers. Therefore, ad networks are needed
to mediate between publishers and advertisers.
Publishers may subscribe to one or more ad networks to earn from displaying digital
ads. In turn, each ad space gets a unique identifier from a specific ad network, which fetch
ads at runtime. However, when an ad request is sent for a vacant space to a linked ad
network, the ad network sometimes has no ads in its inventory right on time. As a result,
users could see a void ad slot.
In response to such an issue, different ad syndications are created by ad networks to fill
the gap in time. Therefore, when the subscribed ad network finds nothing for a slot, the
ad request will be forwarded to one of the syndicated ad networks. Imaginably, communi-
cations between the subscribed and other syndicated ad networks leads to a long redirect
chain, before arriving at the final landing page. Other than syndicated ad networks, ad ex-
change can also be used. It provides real-time bidding for ad slots among various entities,
including ad networks, SSPs, and DSPs. The most commonly used metaphor to describe
the difference is a stock market. In this scenario, an ad exchange is a stock market; whereas,
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ad networks are stock brokers.
As the title specifies, the purpose of this research is to improve security for digital
advertising ecosystems. Digital advertising ecosystems may be threatened or criticized
from different aspects:
• Click Fraud. Like all other ad fraud behaviors, click fraud is usually set by unscrupu-
lous publishers. In mobile settings, for apps running in the foreground, notorious fraud-
sters can either passively hide rendered ads under other app content to trap authentic
clicks (i.e., display fraud), or actively programmatically trigger fake ad clicks (i.e., click
fraud). Besides, the fat finger problem can also accidentally trigger click fraud.
• Malvertising. The term is a portmanteau of “malicious advertising”. Due to the com-
plexity of the ad delivery scheme (e.g., ads with long redirect chains), it is difficult for
ad networks to avoid malvertising. Malvertising URLs would result in either drive-by
downloads or scams.
• User Privacy. In digital advertising, user privacy is steadily infringed upon. In many
cases, users are uncertain as to exactly what privacy they surrender while visiting web-
sites or using mobile apps. Several organizations even specialize in trafficking personal
information gleamed from users. Such data may only be used for marketing or research,
but can also be used for nefarious purposes.
• Ad Revenue Loss. Advertising is the de facto primary way to monetize free con-
tent. While looking to maximize their income, publishers may also lose revenue due
to stealing from attackers. Such stealing activities consist of typosquatting in online
environments, and piggybacking in mobile settings.
• Ad Inappropriateness. Ad networks usually regulate advertised content. For example,
Google AdMob sets ad policies for advertisers [6]. However, untrusted advertisers can
still smuggle inappropriate content within their ads. It is infelicitous, especially when
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children view and click such ads. That’s why certain ad networks talk about COPPA [7]
within their common guidelines.
1.2 Thesis Statement
This dissertation addresses the aforementioned concerns in the context of the following
thesis statement:
Secure digital advertising ecosystems will: 1) reduce the occurrences and impacts of
both security issues (i.e., click fraud, and malvertising) to a minimum; 2) harmonize users’
private information surrendered to tracking and customers’ satisfaction towards advertised
brands; and 3) mitigate other ad-related threats (i.e., revenue stealing attack, and content
inappropriateness).
1.3 Problems
In this dissertation, in order to facilitate our studies, we focus on studying the relations
discussed in the thesis statement. Usually, association allows two variables measured on
the same object to have a relationship, with regards to strength, direction (i.e., positive,
and nagative), and form (i.e., linear, and curved); Whereas, correlation measures linear
association. Therefore, we address the following research issues:
• Correlation between click fraud and malvertising. Traditionally, both ad-related
security topics, click fraud and malvertising, have been studied separately, since the
two attacks have different purposes. While the former is mainly used for publishers to
increase revenue, the latter is to attack users. We are the first who develop a framework
for studying both click fraud and malvertising for mobile ads. Here, we explore the
relation between click fraud and malvertising to learn if and how fraudulent publishers
and untrusted ad networks collude to corrupt the ecosystem.
• Association between users’ private information and advertisers’ virtual payments.
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Nowadays in mobile environments, the in-app advertising service incurs a number of
criticisms: 1) users must passively receive all mobile ads while using apps, 2) users get
nothing from viewing or clicking ads, 3) ad networks transfer user private information
to remote servers in an unencrypted format without user consent, and 4) negative im-
pressions brought from irrelevant ads may harm the advertised brands. Therefore, we
study how users can actively request ads while giving positive impressions to advertised
brands. Furthermore, we investigate how users value their private information, while
advertisers offer virtual payments.
• Two other concerns related to digital advertising ecosystems. We also look into two
other problems closely related to digital advertising. First, we employ the app virtualiza-
tion technique to launch and monitor any ad revenue stealing attack. Second, we classify
inappropriate ad categories under various contexts (i.e., prohibited by ad policies, and
controversial to the general public).
1.4 Contributions
This dissertation makes three primary contributions to the field of security and privacy in
digital advertising ecosystems.
• We developed a data collection framework for mobile ads, which is the first tool that can
collect data from ads’ entire life spans (i.e., request→ load/render→ click→ redirect→
land). It allows us to build a panoramic view of ad-related data and to examine the two
different ad security issues together. Our study reveals that, over 15.44% of malvertising
cases originate from the apps, which initiate click fraud. Surprisingly, we found that
users of the fraudulent apps are much more (21x) likely to be exposed to malicious
ads than other users. In particular, 18.36% ads displayed in those apps are malicious,
whereas only 0.88% ads are found malicious in other apps. Furthermore, we identified
several emerging threats (e.g., cryptojacking ads), through several case studies.
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• We implemented a prototype monetization service — In-App AdPay. With a few minor
changes on the ad network side in the current “in-app advertising” framework, In-App
AdPay not only allows users to actively take a “virtual” share from displaying/clicking
ads, but also lets ad networks avoid liability for collecting users’ private information.
Meanwhile, with our framework, no change is necessary for advertisers: use the same
console as before and pay the same amount of money as usual. However, for the sake
of financial incentives, publishers would be motivated to secure network connections
between mobile users and ad networks. As a result, more tailored ads will be served
via secure connections with users’ consent. Afterwards, we conducted user studies with
42 adult volunteers. While receiving relatively positive feedback, we recognized that
people may still feel uncomfortable when actively giving up their private information.
Therefore, we studied how advertisers can induce users to trade their information with
virtual goods, and then deduced the preceived value of each Android permission.
• After implementing DroidPill with app virtualization, we demonstrated that the app con-
fusion attack can be used to steal ad revenue. Besides, we also conducted the first large-
scale study on ad inappropriateness. About 8.51% of our collected ads are inappropriate
under various contexts: prohibited by ad policies (e.g., having age-restricted content, or
providing improper information related to money), and controversial to the general pub-
lic (e.g., raising media concerns). We also revealed that, attackers are leveraging nested
ads as a new way to bypass content-based regulations.
1.5 Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we go over the background
and current research progress in digital advertising, with an emphasis on security and pri-
vacy [8]. Here, we also talk about the app confusion attack, and a framework for malware
creation (i.e., DroidPill [9]). In Chapter 3, we explore the correlation between the two
ad-related security issues (i.e., click fraud, and malvertising) [10]. In Chapter 4, we study
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the association between users’ private information and advertisers’ virtual payments [11].
Afterwards in Chapter 5, we look into two other concerns related to digital advertising
ecosystems [9, 10]. Finally in Chapter 6, we conclude this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we summarize the technological progress in both online and mobile envi-
ronments for digital advertising, with an emphasis on security and privacy. First, we start
with presenting a brief background on digital advertising ecosystems, Android WebView,
and ad library permissions. Afterwards, we review ad-related scientific articles to date in
the field, focusing primarily on security and privacy, consecutively. In particular, we also
study different attacks in digital advertising. Finally for completeness, we finish the chapter
by briefly talking about other research topics related to digital advertising ecosystems.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Digital Advertising Ecosystems
Figure 2.1: Ad paths
Digital advertising is a relatively new form of marketing that is quickly proliferating
throughout the Internet. It mainly consists of three types (i.e., display ads, video ads,
and search ads), where display ads include small-size banner ads, found in both online and
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mobile environments, and full-screen interstitial ads, found solely in mobile settings. Other
than traditional types, we may also encounter: 1) mobile app install ads, which can finally
be redirected to a designated app marketplace; 2) in-app purchase ads [12], which display
multiple in-app purchase items for sale within a single mobile ad; and 3) rewarded video
ads[13], which offers rewards to in-app users for viewing/clicking sponsored video ads
promoting other mobile apps. While such unrelated ads reach a high average click-through
rate of 13.64% [14], Apple cracked down on apps which reward users with in-game coins
for watching a video [15].
When a user views multiple ads on a webpage or an app, these ads may originate from
multiple sources, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. The red highlighted path represents the sim-
plest path with fewest hops between the advertiser and the user. In this figure, the advertiser
represents the money source for promoting its product or service, while the user serves as
the initiator of actions within the publisher’s webpage or developers’ mobile app. As for
the ad network, it links advertisers and publishers all together. However, the advertising
ecosystem is not that simple. Other entities also exist within this model as indicated in
the multiple other arrows showing various interactions. For example, the DSP serves to
aggregate multiple advertisers, and the SSP aggregates multiple publishers. Additionally,
the ad exchange is similar to the NYSE in that it gathers all buyers and sellers together.
Buyers include publishers, SSPs, and ad networks, while sellers include advertisers, DSPs
and other ad networks. Within this hybrid ecosystem, many paths from the advertiser to the
user are possible. But in general, money flows from advertisers to publishers through ad
networks, whereas information flow is bilateral. Finally, ad networks may offer different
pricing models (e.g., CPM, CPC, and CPA) to select appropriate ads for each of their pub-
lishers and advertisers. In CPM, advertisers pay for ad displays in bulk. In CPC, advertisers
pay only if users click their ads. And in CPA, advertisers pay higher than ad click, but only
if a user conducts a closed sale or a particular action at the moment. In order to maximize
profits, ad networks may apply an “arbitrage” strategy, which buys traffic at a low price
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based on CPM, and then sell it at a higher rate based on CPC or CPA.
Figure 2.2: Ad flow
We now explore the process that occurs whenever a potential customer clicks an ad. In
Figure 2.2, the steps of this process are depicted. When a user starts loading a publisher’s
webpage or a developer’s mobile app (steps 1 and 2), ads are requested from the subscribed
ad network’s server (step 3). After identifying the publisher ID, the ad network’s server logs
the request (step 4). And then, it applies the rules previously established with its advertisers,
and returns an ad that includes a unique identifier for click tracking (step 5). Once a user
clicks the ad (step 6), an HTTP GET request is sent to the ad network (step 7). This is
considered a click-through event by the ad network, and it is logged for billing purposes
(step 8). The user is then redirected to the advertiser’s landing page through the client via
HTTP 302 status code (step 9). The landing page is hosted on either the advertiser’s ad
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server directly, or on a CDN to decrease latency. Having reached this point, the user is
now able to browse items on the landing page (steps 10 and 11). According to Wang et
al. [16], the content delivery for online advertising may take about 100 ms for distributed
network architecture (e.g., AOL/Akamai: 87 ms, and Google: 122 ms), or around 200 ms
for a standalone server (e.g., Adblade: 207 ms).
Usually, when an ad network first encounters a user, it sends a cookie to the user, or
uses other indirect methods (e.g., an IP address and HTTP user agent combination). Af-
terwards, the ad network can thereby label the user, determine his or her browsing pattern,
and measure the effectiveness of served ad campaigns.
Particularly for mobile advertising, pioneering studies in Android and iOS may be at-
tributed to TaintDroid [17] and PiOS [18], respectively. TaintDroid finds that half of its
studied apps share location information with third-party ad servers in plaintext or in binary
format without user consent. Likewise, from a study of 1,100 top-selling free Android
apps, [19] shows that A&A services are willing to probe permissions and acquire other
critical information (e.g., IMEI). As for iOS, PiOS points out that more than half of the
studied apps result in leaking UDID because of its embedded A&A libraries.
2.1.2 Android WebView
In Android, most ads are displayed via WebView. The current ANDROID SYSTEM WE-
BVIEW is a pre-installed component, which serves as a mini browser without the address
bar. Even though transparent to app developers, the nature of the WebView component
has been changed a lot along with the evolution of Android OS. Since Android 4.4, it
has moved from using the WebKit rendering engine to sharing the same Chromium-based
codebase with Chrome for Android. In Android 5.0, the component came out as a stan-
dalone APK, where mobile users can find its updates on Play Store. Starting from Android
6.0, only prebuilt WebView versions are shared within the AOSP. Afterwards, in Android
7.0, tech-savvy people may find the ANDROID WEBVIEW SHELL, a one-tab experimental
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browser, installed on different Android emulators.
Based on Chromium source tree, the APK file of the current WebView component de-
pends on a C++-compiled shared library (i.e., dynamic library), LIBWEBVIEWCHROMIUM.SO,
which consists of an entry point (i.e., WEBVIEW ENTRY POINT.CC) and a source set (i.e.,
static library), COMMON. Within the source set, Java code encapsulates C++ and provides
an AWCONTENTS object. By adding LOGCAT messages for function calls within AwCon-
tents, we can thus use ADB to communicate with an Android emulator and view the device
log in real-time.
WebView is a VIEW object that displays webpages. It cannot be used standalone with-
out an ACTIVITY component, which represents a single screen with a UI. With the UI
Automation tools, app developers can access, identify, and manipulate the UI elements.
However, such tools cannot access the DOM within a WebView. Unlike ads in a browser
that researchers can directly resolve ad URLs from their DOM trees, when an ad WebView
receives a touch event, it triggers an AwContents object’s onTouchEvent() first, and
then consecutively tops down to the Blink rendering engine for resolving the embedded
URL from its DOM tree.
2.1.3 Ad Library Permissions
Both Android and iOS devices require permissions to controll access to system resources
as well as serve mobile ads. While Android employs a fine-grained permission system [20]
with over 90 permissions, iOS 11 has only 16 permissions [21]. Initially, the difference
between these two platforms was whether to explicitly grant permissions during app in-
stallation. But in Android 5.9, the OS reclassified certain permissions into groups. And
a device running Android 6.0 and up allows users to control their app permissions at the
first time of use. Nowadays, Android has over 90 permissions, where 26 dangerous ones
are gathered into 9 permission groups. Coincidentally, most of these dangerous permis-
sions are overlapped with the 12 most abused [22], ranging from retrieving running apps
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to sending SMS messages. In order to get income, app developers may import ad libraries,
which require specific permissions to collect private information from mobile users for ad
targeting — the process of selecting specific ads displayed to a given user. In Android, all
permissions used by an app are stored in the ANDROIDMANIFEST.XML file. Given that
an ad network can access the same services, with the same permissions and process under
the same UI, as its host app, users are not able to distinguish between granted permissions
used by the app itself, its mobile ads, or both. Therefore, here we focus on identifying the
permissions usually asked by ad libraries.
The findings in mobile advertising are more or less related to permissions requested
by host apps. Leontiadis et al. [23] highlighted a couple of differences between free and
paid apps in Android. Case in point, 10% of the free and 40% of the paid apps run with-
out permissions; however, 7% of the free and 1.8% of the paid apps demand more than
10 permissions. Moreover, 73% of the free and 41% of the paid apps request at least one
dangerous permission. The free apps dominate in most categories except two (i.e., “Per-
sonalization” and “Books & References”). Also, on average, the free apps request 2-3 more
permissions than the paid ones in the same category. A study of over 1.8K apps from the
SlideMe app store shows that 73% of the apps have permissions used exclusively by the
ad libraries [24]. Moreover, Khan et al. [25] revealed that the most used apps (i.e., SNS
and IM apps), on which the users spend more than 60% of their time, have no ads. On
the other hand, permissions are requested for ad libraries, and the average number of per-
missions required by an ad network is 3.3 on average [26]. Several research works [23,
24, 26, 27, 28] provide a list of 3-10 core permissions used in ad libraries, where IN-
TERNET is not the only a mandatory permission, but the ACCESS NETWORK STATE
and READ PHONE STATE permissions are widely used in over 70% of ad libraries. The
usage of these permissions also shows a steady increase.
Previous research works [28, 29, 30, 31, 32] listed over 25 third-party libraries, among
which 14 are still in use with documentation in English, including the dominant mo-
13
bile ad library — AdMob. Ad libraries usually ask specific permissions to work prop-
erly. Liu et al. [33] listed most used and checked permissions by ad libraries. According
to MRAID [34], about 21 Android permissions may be utilized for ad libraries1. The
INTERNET permission is undoubtedly always required by all ad libraries, and the Ac-
cess Network State permission also comes along in most cases. Therefore, there are 19
ad-related permissions optionally used for ad libraries.
2.2 Security
Usually, people may experience two security issues (i.e., click fraud, and malvertising).
2.2.1 Online Environments
Click fraud within a browser occurs when a script, program, or person masquerades as a
legitimate user clicking ads, in one of three ways: 1) using clickbots, 2) tricking users into
clicking ads, and 3) paying human clickers. All three ways share one common characteris-
tic: click fraudsters receive a higher return on investment than do the legitimate publishers.
It is usually found in CPC advertising models where ad networks and publishers benefit
from illegitimate clicks, and money flows from advertisers directly to ad networks, and
ultimately, to publishers.
For clickbots, Miller et al. [35] studied two such clickbots (i.e., Fiesta and 7cy), in con-
junction with a pre-recorded C&C dataset and a self-built C&C server that traps outbound
clickbot flows. In Fiesta, three CPC components (i.e., ad server, search engine, and click
server) interact with ad networks. But, 7cy mimics human browsing behaviors at various
locations and times. Besides, for ZeroAccess — one of the largest click fraud botnets,
[36] discloses its components (i.e., P2P communication, auto-clicking module, and serpent
1Internet, Access Network State, Vibrate, Write Contacts, Record Audio, Get Accounts,
Read Phone State, Call Phone, Write External Storage, Read Calendar, Write Calendar, Activ-
ity Recognition, Camera, Wake Lock, Read Logs, Access Coarse Location, Access Fine Location,
Send SMS, Access WiFi State, Change WiFi State, Read History Bookmarks
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module) to hijack user search traffic. After matching different data sources with a combi-
nation of timing information and reactions to external events, researchers finally identified
54 dirty ad units with ZeroAccess traffic. Afterwards, researchers move on to detect click
fraud, as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Click fraud detection in online advertising
Side Project Description
Advertiser [37] Use Bayesian estimation as advertisers to measure
click-spam rate, and employ graph-clustering over
features in the HTTP request as ad networks to detect
heavy-hitting clusters
Ad network
Passive [38] Test the legitimacy of individual ad clicks actively us-
ing either targeted ads with irrelevant display text or
the reverse
Active
[39] Detect duplicate clicks in pay-per-click streams with
two bloom filter related algorithms
[40] Detect fraudulent clicks that falls into an anomalous
region outside of an expected log-revenue range and
detect six different classes of click-spam attacks
[41] Construct an anomaly detection model with local traf-
fic and features related to cookies and IP addresses,
and identify fraudulent publishers when the fraction
between the number of suspicious and total requests
surpasses a threshold
Outsider [42] Use unsupervised anomaly detection techniques over
user behavior to distinguish bad behaviors modeled by
Principal Component Analysis to detect click-spam in
Facebook ads
Other than clickbots, researchers unrevealed multiple tactics used for luring users to
click ads, including DNS hijacking, Made for AdSense (MFA), and typosquatting (also
known as URL hijacking). [43] traces from an IP back to the conspiracy with DNS hi-
jacking. Also, according to [44], fraudsters can make use of trending terms to build their
MFA websites, so users can be easily lured into their websites through high-ranking search
results. Furthermore, after crawling over 285K typosquatting domains, [45] discovers that
80% of such sites are monetized with CPC ads, which correctly spell the domain names
being imitated.
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Malvertising often happens after ad clicks to distribute malicious content (e.g., drive-
by downloads, and scams). Drive-by downloads happen to people without authorizing the
actions or understanding the conseequences, Scams use fake antivirus, deceptive lottery, or
other phishing approaches to lure people to disclose their private information.
Researchers, who collect ads in online advertising, focus on either ad networks [46] or
redirect chains [47, 48]. [46] uses more than 600K ads to show that some ad networks are
more prone to serving malicious ads than others. After studying the redirection chains of
display ads within the Alexa top 90K websites, Li et al. [47] identified the clustering nature
of these malicious nodes, and implemented a topology-based detection system (i.e., Mad-
Tracer) to detect malvertising activities using existing and newly learned rules. Finally,
over 1% of the sites was found to provide malicious content. Likewise, [48] extracts 8 sta-
tistical features from HTTP redirections, and applies a supervised decision tree classifier to
identify malicious redirect chains. Further still, the researchers employed the methodology
to a large dataset with more than 15K clients, and accurately identify malicious chains with
recall and precision values over 90% and up to 98%, respectively.
2.2.2 Mobile Environments
Table 2.2: Nonorganic clicks in mobile advertising
Type Project
Accidental LucidTouch [49]
Fraudulent AdSplit [27], MAdFraud [31], DECAF [50],
QUIRE [51], LayerCake [52]
Due to screen size limitations and financial incentives, over 40% of mobile clicks are
either accidental or fraudulent [53]. Table 2.2 shows the research works in the field. Click
fraud can be conducted with [50] or without [31] human intervention. Developers may
manipulate the screen layout and place ads in regions that cause unintended clicks by real
users on embedded ads. That practice, however, definitely violates known policies. For
example, in Microsoft Advertising, developers must not “edit, resize, modify, filter, ob-
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scure, hide, make transparent, or reorder any advertising”. Accordingly, DECAF [50] au-
tomatically scans the visual elements of an app and efficiently detects rule violations for
Windows-based mobile platforms. Other than display fraud, developers may employ bots
or cheap labor to click ads as well. Crussel et al. [31] revealed that mobile apps running in
the background are also able to render ads and click on ads without interaction, developed
MAdFraud to identify such frauds. By investigating over 130K apps crawled from Play
Store and 35K malware samples, they find that 30% of these apps completed ad requests
while running in the background, and also 22 apps generate automatic clicks.
Due to these findings, user-generated click verification is needed to protect the advertis-
ing ecosystem from bots. Therefore, researchers developed countermeasures with process
and UI separation. AdSplit [27] allows users to see ads through the transparent regions
in an app activity, wraps ad activities with a stub library, and uses an HMAC-based sig-
nature in RPC to verify the user-generated click events. AFrame [54] separates different
processes without transparent regions and stub libraries, so that existing ad libraries are still
usable without any modification. In addition, AFrame uses an independent graphic buffer
to enforce display isolation, and modifies the InputManager to realize the input isolation.
LayerCake [52] separates not only processes but also UI hierarchy tree of an app activity
and its ad activities.
Malvertising in mobile advertising results in the exploration of either ad networks [55,
56] or redirect chains [57]. Grace et al. [55] developed AdRisk to statically analyze the
APIs associated with 76 different permissions and refine 14 dangous APIs used by ad li-
braries. Afterwards, an unsafe service was found to download suspicious payloads, which
allows the host app to be remotely controlled. Meanwhile, DroidRanger [56] utilizes two
schemes (i.e. permission-based behavioral footprinting, and heuristics-based filtering) to
analyze 204K apps from five different Android markets, and finds 2 zero-day malware
out of 211 malicious apps. One of these two samples, Plankton, uses DexClassLoader to
dynamically and remotely load untrusted Java binary at runtime for ad libraries. Finally,
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Rastogi et al. [57] automated ad clicks, analyzed redirect chains with VirusTotal, and re-
vealed several cases related to fake antivirus software and scams.
2.3 Privacy
In digital advertising, user privacy space is steadily infringed upon. In many cases, users
are uncertain as to exactly how ad networks track and target them while visiting web pages
or using mobile apps. Their private information may be used for marketing or research, but
it can also be potentially used for other nefarious purposes. The latter reason has driven
researchers to explore new ways to protect user privacy in both online and mobile environ-
ments.
2.3.1 Online Environments
Nowadays, a great number of websites bundle multiple trackers. Roesner et al. [58] de-
veloped the TrackingTracker add-on to identify over 500 trackers on the Alexa top 500
websites, classified web tracking behaviors into five categories more or less related to ad-
vertising, and offered the ShareMeNot add-on to mitigate web tracking with social widgets
by removing third-party cookies. In one extreme case, over seven trackers were found on
a website. Among these trackers are Google Analytics, which tracks within sites, and both
DoubleClick and Facebook, which track across sites (i.e., users are tracked when moving
from one website to the next). Additionally, they used 2006 AOL search logs to reveal that
some trackers can capture over 20% of a user’s browsing behavior. Mayer and Mitchell [59]
surveyed both policy and technology related to third-party web tracking, which includes
stateful (i.e., supercookie) and stateless (i.e., fingerprinting) tracking mechanisms for the
technology part. CRAWLIUM [60] measures the effectiveness of browser extensions in
blocking stateful and stateless trackers with over 100K websites. It shows that, a small
number of studied extensions can effectively block most stateful trackers, but none can
block all fingerprinting services. Yet, third-party tracking without user permission remains
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an ethical challenge. Thus, researchers continue to seek balance with tracking technologies
used in web pages, including third-party web services such as ads, analytics, and social
plug-ins, with user privacy.
The use of web tracking is to locate targeted users. Adscape [61] crawled over 175K
distinct ads with over 340 different user profiles, and found that the majority of websites
use targeting mechanisms (e.g., interest-based, and age & gender-based) over 80% of their
ad inventory. But, there are still many instances where ads are not dependent on user
profiles. Kim et al. [62] built a Finite State Machine website model for browsing profiles,
and developed an automated ad crawler — ADHoneyClient, which fetches ads with crafted
browsing profiles and emulates browsing activities.
For individuals with privacy concerns, the Internet is a highly challenging environment.
Tighter privacy protection is needed for many IT companies as well. This is especially so
for well-known IT companies, like Google and Facebook. Both perform the dual role of ad
network and publisher in order to best monetize their advertising efforts [63], and thus, pos-
sess the greatest potential to affect the entire ecosystem. For example, Google sponsored
ads are displayed on 80% of all publishers, while Facebook’s ads are shown on 23% of all
publishers, or 85% of the top 10% of publishers [63]. Their methods for employing ads also
vary. For instance, Google AdSense employs MediaBot to crawl web pages for keywords
and use them to serve contextually relevant ads [64]. In contrast, Facebook allows adver-
tisers to create fine-grained, targeted ads based on various factors released by users (e.g.,
age, gender, location, sexual preferences, user demographics and interests), where age and
gender are the most important [65, 66]. However, both of these advertising systems may
be defective. Castelluccia et al. [67] observe that, with the Google Display Network, any
adversary can infer a Google user’s interest categories with just a small number of targeted
ads. Their results show that 79% of the inferred categories are correctly reconstructed, and
58% of the original categories are successfully retrieved. Similarly, Korolova [65] explains
that with Facebook, any advertiser can infer a user’s posted private information with CPM
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ads, or even unposted private information with CPC ads. Although Facebook made efforts
with a minimum campaign reach strategy, imposing a minimum target threshold of 20 peo-
ple, to prevent an attacker from targeting a specific individual, the researcher points out
that these efforts are circumvented if an attacker creates 20 Facebook accounts with similar
target attributes.
In online advertising, various add-ons are introduced by researchers seeking to combine
privacy protection, as listed in Table 2.3. For example, both Privad [68], and Adnostic [69]
choose to profile users locally. With Privad, an untrusted dealer is introduced between an
ad network and multiple users, and further masks the ad serving and accounting via an
encrypted channel so as to protect the anonymity of the users. With Adnostic, the most
suitable ad is obtained from a small set of appropriate ads downloaded from the ad net-
work. An impression counter is then used in the CPM model to compute and encrypt
statistics in order to prevent the ad network from learning about the user. Another solu-
tion, RePRIV [70], permits publishers to mine user interests and behaviors, but stores the
private information in an encrypted common repository. This data can then be released to
ad networks in a way that aligns with user preferences. Social add-ons or plugins, such as
ShareMeNot [58], and SafeButton [71], are also being implemented. ShareMeNot condi-
tionally removes third-party cookies while loading buttons and allowing selected elements
that match the user’s intent. As for SafeButton, the social plug-in agent not only maintains
its private data locally, which is no more than 150MB for a maximum number of 5K Face-
book friends, it also caches publicly accessible data (e.g., the page’s total number of “Like”
selections). Surprisingly, the render time for presenting combined content with SafeButton
is even faster than that of the original Facebook version [71].
Recently, more and more users around the world employ adblockers to remove on-
line ads; in return, publishers employ different anti-adblockers on their websites. There-
fore, researchers follow up and also investigate the phenomenon from the technical aspect.
[72] conducts a first look at ad blocking detection using three classifiers, where the ran-
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Table 2.3: Privacy protection in online advertising
Add-on Project Description
Browser
Privad [68] Profile users locally with interests and demographics
Adnostic [69] Profile users locally with keywords and URLs
RePriv [70] Store user privacy at publishers’ encrypted repositories
Social
ShareMeNot [58] Remove third-party cookies, but allow intended elements
SafeButton [71] Store both private and public data locally
dom forest achieves 93.1% recall, and 94.8% precision, on the Alexa top-100K websites.
About 1,100 websites perform ad blocking detection, of which most use simple passive ap-
proaches. Out of these 1,100 publishers, about 300 websites request users to disable their
adblockers. In addition, [73] compares and contrasts the evolution of two popular anti-
adblock filter lists (i.e., Anti-Adblock Killer List, and Combined EasyList), which have
different implementations. After tracing back the Alexa top-5k websites over the past five
years, researchers revealed that 1) the coverage of these filter lists has improved since 2014,
and 2) the Anti-Adblock Killer List outperforms the Combined EasyList. Afterwards, in
order to update the filter lists more quickly, a machine learning based approach is used to
detect anti-adblock scripts using static JavaScript code analysis. More recently, [74] detects
anti-adblockers on 30.5% of the Alexa top-10K websites. By manually analyzing one third
of these detected websites, researchers revealed that, more provide no visible reactions.
Afterwards, two methods (i.e., JavaScript rewriting, and API hooking) are developed to
bypass anti-adblockers.
2.3.2 Mobile Environments
The studies of mobile tracking is relatively new than that in online settings. In order to
serve more targeted ads and further maximize ad revenue, several parties, including app
developers and ad networks, greedily collect user privacy via tracking. For example, the
People Hub, a unique feature of Windows Phone that integrates several social networking
features, may directly expose user information [24]. When ad libraries are bundled within
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an app and act jointly with a unique and persistent identifier, user privacy is easily leaked
and uploaded to remote servers. [28] shows that, user privacy is easily compromised due to
the lack of secure protocols, like HTTPS, being deployed for fear of the additional overhead
created by encryption. Even well-known apps like Facebook for Android permit 22% of its
traffic to go unencrypted [75]. Grace et al. [55] considered A&A libraries as a whole, but
other studies are more specific to analytics. For instance, Applog [76] was implemented
from a TaintDroid-like system runtime and an Android app tracking system for sending
analytic information to servers. Afterwards, researchers recruited 20 participants for three
weeks to obtain tracking statistics. From the dataset, it shows that web cookie, Android ID,
and IMEI are the most used. While analyzing A&A statistics, the authors also discovered
that identifiers are usually sent as plaintext. [77] utilizes the Lumen dataset with over 11K
real-world users. It contains over 8.5M flows from 14.5K apps to 40.5K domains, where
2.1K are used for third-party advertising and tracking services, and owned by 292 parent
organizations. Accordingly, researchers revealed that users’ activities can be tracked across
devices. Finally, [60] evaluates two blocking approaches for mobile ads, including DNS-
based blocking (e.g., “AdAway”, and “MoaAB”), and “Adblock Plus for Android” with
EasyList, with 10K Android apps. These blocking tools offer limited protection against
third-party tracking in Android.
Mobile ad targeting has also been studied. [30] collected over 225K ads using simu-
lated user profiles, correlated ads to targeting profiles with Bayes’ rule and Pearson’s chi
square test, and found that 43% and 39% of the ads are involved in location- and user-based
targeting, respectively. Also, MAdScope [32] harvests 1) 500K ads from 150K Android
apps using 101 ad networks, and 2) 1M ads from the top 10 ad networks. Accord to the
first dataset, apps have not yet exploited the full potential of targeting. Meanwhile, based
on the second dataset, in-app ads use significantly less behavioral and demographic infor-
mation for ad targeting; whereas, the top three app categories receiving targeted ads are
Games, Arts (e.g., wallpapers), and Recreation (e.g., ring tones).
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Since mobile devices are frequently in a user’s possession for calling, messaging, brows-
ing, and other daily activities, maintaining privacy is very important to both users and
researchers. The first attempts at revealing the dangers to privacy in mobile advertising
originate from a large-scale research investigation of third-party apps. In [55], researchers
identified 100 representative in-app ad libraries within 52.1% of the entire 100K Android
apps. Researchers in [28] investigated user privacy in 13 popular ad libraries within the top
500 Android apps, by classifying the permissions specified in their documentation as well
as figuring out the misused permissions and insecure JavaScript interfaces. Book et al. [26]
investigated 66 ad library names and versions from 114K free apps in Play Store, Later,
Book and Wallach [29] studied the top 20 of 103 ad libraries, and identified 11 ad libraries
which use privacy leaking APIs that allow host apps to transmit demographics. In [78],
findings indicate that the principle of least privilege is not always followed, since some
host apps request additional permissions solely used by ad libraries. In [79], researchers
looked into four popular ad libraries (i.e., AdMob, MoPub, AirPush and AdMarvel), and
investigated what malicious advertisers can learn about mobile users through ads. Using
malicious JavaScript code within ads, advertisers can read files from a device’s external
storage, and thus launch inference attacks related to user privacy, including medications,
gender preferences for dating partners, browsing history, and social graph. Meanwhile,
Pluto [80] reveal both in-app (e.g., local files, and user input) and out-app (e.g., public
APIs) attack channels. It utilizes natural language processing to illustrate targeted data
(e.g., contact information, interests, demographics, and medical conditions) via the in-app
attack channels, and leverages machine learning and data mining models to make infer-
ences about users via the out-app attack channels. Similarly, [81] reveals mobile ads de-
livered by Google with 217 real users that, 1) there is a statistically significant correlation
between user profiles and observed ads, and 2) it is likely to learn users’ demographics
(e.g., gender, and parental status) through personalized ads.
Afterwards, researchers came up with different countermeasures to protect user privacy,
23
Table 2.4: Privacy protection in mobile advertising
Classification Project Description
Mobile
[82] Advertising API with 2 corresponding permissions





Use a common agent to profile users locally, and preserve
privacy with a delay-tolerant networking protocol along
multiple hops of the path
[85]
Use an agent to carry an ad with a match estimator, and




[23] Send private data separately to publishers and ad networks
[24] Use a coarse-grained profile
[86] Select the most relevant ads from a set of ads
as shown in Table 2.4. Barrera et al. [87] proposed to replace the INTERNET permission
with a more fine-grained permission of INTERNET.ADVERTISING (*.admob.com) to ob-
tain ads from the AdMob domain. Meanwhile, Leontiadis et al. [23] proposed a privacy
control loop to harmonize interests between users and developers by using user-defined
permissions in ACCESS ADVERTISEMENT SERVICE to separate the host app and ad
libraries. AdDroid [82] integrates advertising services into the Android system. It provides
a public library API and two corresponding advertising permissions (i.e., ADVERTISING
and LOCATION ADVERTISING) for app developers and uses IPC calls for ad requests.
When the system service receives a fetchAd IPC call made by the AdDroid API, it estab-
lishes a connection with the proper ad network to get the data, and waits for a follow-up
IPC call in order to retrieve the ad. Beyond efforts inside of apps, other solutions attempt
to wall off private data from being sent to remote servers. After recognizing that 110 pop-
ular and free Android apps were sending location and IMEI to A&A servers, Hornyack et
al. [83] implemented AppFence, which consists of two primary features for privacy control
— those being data shadowing and exfiltration blocking. While the former covertly sub-
stitutes sensitive information by sending manipulated data or an empty dataset, the latter,
relying on TaintDroid [17], prevents private data from being sent off device by covertly
dropping buffered data or overtly simulating an airplane mode state. However, as mobile
app users may only pay attention to the ad being rendered when a page is loaded [64], per-
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sonalized ads are of greater concern to users. This is especially so for impatient users who
only spend a few seconds on each app. Therefore, ad targeting is also important along-
side privacy preservation and other factors such as overhead. Furthermore, inheriting from
the heuristics used in online advertising, the solutions for the issue of trade off between
ad personalization and user privacy can be classified into two categories: with [84, 85] or
without [23, 24, 86] an intermediary. MobiAd [84] proposes an architecture that serves
local ads by using the mobile agent to profile and maintain personal data locally, caching
the relevant ads, and preserving privacy with a delay-tolerant networking protocol along
multiple hops of the path. In [85], researchers proposed each agent carrying an ad with
a match estimator. The match estimator then makes a decision to render an ad by using
its access to a locally stored user profile. Another proposal [23] includes market-aware
privacy control models allowing users to send private information separately to developers
and ad networks, in order to balance the flows of private information sent to ad networks
for revenue. Furthermore, MoRePriv [24] employs personal preference miners to parse and
classify different signals (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, SMS, email, and HTTP traffic) into mul-
tiple personas. It then replaces the private information with a coarse-grained profile within
apps, using the feature for server-based personalization. In addition, Hardt and Nath [86]
developed a framework allowing for mobile devices to select the most relevant ad from a
set of ads sent from a server. This selection is based on the estimated CTRs of a large user
population.
Last but not least, comparing with the increasing popularity of adblockers in in-app ad
blocking in online environments, in-app ad blocking is still latent. However, [88] leverages
the app virtualization technique, which encapsulates a guest app in a restricted execution
environment within the context of another sandbox app, to block in-app ads on stock An-
droid by effectively identifying ad code and robustly stripping the code.
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2.4 Attacks
Besides measuring and protecting digital advertising ecosystems, researchers may also find
loopholes that could attack the ecosystems. Meng et al. [89] introduced a profile polluter
and demonstrated how publishers, exploiting short term browsing history, can significantly
affect re-marketing and behavioral targeting mechanisms for advertising and change the
type of ads received by a user. In doing so, the polluter can bias as much as 74% of re-
marketed ads and 12% for behavioral ads, while yielding up to a 33% increase in revenue
for fraudulent publishers. Thomas et al. [90] crawled all injected DOM elements from
visitors to Google websites, and revealed that 38% of 50.8K Chrome extensions and 17%
of 34.4K Windows binaries injected inorganic ads. Also, 192 deceptive ad injection ex-
tensions were still on the Chrome Web Store, and over 3K brands were affected. Kim et
al. [62] utilized ADHoneyClient to reveal the targeting strategies used by 254 out of 291
advertisers selected from Alexa Top 500, and drained up to $155.89 within an hour when
attacking a controlled advertiser and three real-world advertisers.
Additionally, we elaborate on a framework for malware creation — DroidPill, which
we used for launching ad revenue stealing attacks. DroidPill employs the app virtualization
technique to achieve the app confusion attack. Here we classify app virtualization into
two categories, including inclusive (e.g., Boxify [91]), and exclusive (e.g., NJAS [92]).
Boxify and NJAS are two existing app virtualization systems that sandbox unmodified
and untrusted apps in stock Android. In their implementations, a sandbox app contains at
least two functional components: sandbox service and broker. While the former is mainly
responsible for virtual context setup and initialization (e.g., install the hooking code), the
latter performs virtualization logic and enforces security policies.
Boxify is an inclusive virtualization system that leverages the “isolated process” feature
to create a tamper-proof app sandboxing system. In Android, an app running in an isolated
process cannot conduct any operation which requires Android permissions (e.g., access
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Figure 2.3: Boxify’s system architecture
Figure 2.4: NJAS’s system architecture
data on SD card). In Boxify, the sandbox app’s broker runs in a normal process, and the
guest apps run in different isolated processes along with the sandbox service. At start
time, the sandbox service installs Shim, which hooks the global offset table and redirects
the Binder IPC and the guest app’s system-level calls to the broker. After the guest app is
loaded, the broker monitors references and performs virtualization logic. Figure 2.3 depicts
its system architecture.
NJAS is an exclusive virtualization system that builds its sandbox system on top of the
ptrace mechanism. Unlike Boxify, NJAS sets up the broker and a guest app in separated
processes that have the same app privileges. It relies on the ptrace system call to ensure
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Figure 2.5: DroidPill’s system architecture
that the broker can intercept and inspect system calls made by the guest app, including
adverse ptrace calls’ prevention. NJAS suffers two limitations, that lead to an unfledged
app virtualization system: First, its sandbox app can only run one guest app; Second, it does
not have sufficient AOT and misses translating a number of app object types. Figure 2.4
depicts its system architecture.
Ideally, DroidPill should use inclusive app virtualization, which permits a sandbox app
to virtualize non-system apps and creates a workspace to manage and execute multiple
guest apps at the same time. However, inclusive app virtualization breaks the UI Integrity
requirement for the majority of Android devices, and asks sandbox apps to acquire a large
number of Android permissions to work with a variety of guest apps. As an offense system,
DroidPill should meet the UI Integrity requirement, under which users cannot visually tell
whether a guest app runs in the native or virtual execution context. Therefore, we adopt
the exclusive method for DroidPill, since sandbox apps are built based on the APK files
of predefined guest apps, and original icons of the guest apps can be added to the sandbox
apps and statically registered to Android at app installation. Unlike NJAS, DroidPill can
also virtualize multiple guest apps simultaneously. As a result, one DroidPill malware can
reliably mount attacks against multiple benign apps on a device.
In DroidPill, a sandbox app consists of three parts (i.e., constructor, broker, and bait).
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Figure 2.5 depicts its system architecture without bait. While constructor is responsible for
installing broker and loading guest apps, broker is in charge of virtualization and attacks
against guest apps by mediating communications between a guest app and the OS (i.e.,
kernel, and system services). The constructor and the broker work together to build a virtual
execution context for loading and running a guest app. As for bait, it contains attack vectors
to achieve the app confusion attack, which invisibly hijacks guest apps’ launch sequences.
Such attack vectors include app shortcut manipulation, which employs two shortcut-related
permissions to stealthily substitute the shortcut of a benign app with DroidPill’s, and top
activity preemption, which uses side-channel attacks to occupy the on-top activity position
of a user-launched benign app.
2.5 Others
2.5.1 Ad Collection
Due to the fact that ad content is dynamically generated, various methodologies are used
to crawl ads. Collecting online ads is relatively easier when not in a mobile setting. In
online advertising, researchers can either run scripts with their add-ons [47, 61] or build a
Selenium-based crawler [46], with Alexa’s top-ranked website lists. Also, the researchers
can either intercept HTTP traffic [46, 47] or only harvest ad-related visual elements [61].
Nevertheless, ads’ life spans can be easily deduced without triggering ad clicks. Whereas,
in mobile advertising, researchers are still able to analyze HTTP traffic [31, 32, 57], but
it’s more difficult to track ads’ life spans. For example, since no touch events (except for
click fraud) are involved in [31], their studies stop at ad loading/rendering. But, both [32]
and [57] consider every touch event as a starting point. Similar to [57], we customize the
browser to capture post-click URLs and webpages. But, the use of a custom WebView
actually allows us to sniff HTTP traffic without any browser.
29
2.5.2 Content Analysis
In order to analyze web content, [93] uses the Alchemy API to label all crawled webpages,
and categorizes them into different topic categories. Likewise, we use Google Cloud’s
Vision API [94] and Natural Language API [95] to analyze our dataset, besides using
the CETD algorithm [96] to only encompass web content and anchored links. Similar
to finding resolved ad URLs, content scraping in the mobile settings is not so easy as that
in a browser. Therefore, both [50] and [64] capture third-party apps’ page contents on
Windows-based mobile platforms. While the former extracts page information with the UI
extraction channel from Monkey [97], the latter instruments app binaries to insert custom
logging code. Furthermore, [98] studies whether ads are consistent with host apps’ matu-
rity ratings on a small scale that is below 4K ads. Also, their “topic classification” part is
not well elaborated; therefore, we are thus unable to make any technical comparison here.
2.5.3 Human Factors
User studies in smartphones are more or less related to permissions. In [99], authors utilize
two guiding principles to make a selection among four permission-granting mechanisms
(i.e., automatic granting, trusted UI, runtime consent dialogs, and install-time warnings).
Felt et al. run two usability studies and revealed that current permission warnings in An-
droid do not help users make decisions during installation [100]. Meanwhile in [101],
Kelly et al. found a clearer privacy warning could direct users to install apps requesting
fewer permissions. Researchers also looked into permissions in details. In [102], every
dangerous permissions used in different scenarios (i.e., publicly, with friends, with adver-
tisers, and sent to servers) are ranked by users. Also in [103], researchers revealed that in
order to let users assess evaluate apps easily, risks should be decomposed into four different
dimensions (e.g., personal information privacy, and data integrity).
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CHAPTER 3
CORRELATION BETWEEN CLICK FRAUD AND MALVERTISING
3.1 Motivation
Traditionally, both ad-related security issues (i.e., click fraud, and malvertising) have been
studied separately, since the two attacks have different purposes. While the former is
mainly used for app developers to increase revenue, the latter is to menace users. Here,
we will explore if the two attacks have an internal relation.
3.2 Methodology
In this section, we present the steps used to pick up target apps, as well as the design and
implementation of our data collection framework for mobile ads.
3.2.1 App Selection
We selected 143K free Play Store apps that were randomly crawled in December 2016
and March 2017. Collecting all ads in an app requires sophisticated UI automation and
potentially a significant amount of time. To speed up the ad collection process, we aim to
collect only ads that are shown on the first/main app activities. Thus, we need to first filter
out apps that do not contain any ad in their first activities. As ads are normally contained
within WebViews in an Android app, we filter out apps that do not contain a WebView
in their main activities. We also remove apps with multiple top WebViews in the main
activities. Otherwise, we would not be able to distinguish the data generated from clicks
by the UI automation tool on any of the WebViews. We kept 29.3K apps in the dataset
after the above steps. Note that some apps may still contain more than one WebView and a
user might not be able to directly interact with some of the WebViews. For example, some
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smaller WebViews might be blocked/covered by a huge top WebView. We are not able to
detect those blocked WebViews using our UI automation tool.
We further exclude apps that do have one top WebView but do not host ads and retain
11.8K apps. In particular, we construct a domain name list of known ad networks, and use
the list to match the traffic sent after each app launch. If none of the requests matches with
any of the 1,183 ad-related domains [104, 105], the app would be excluded. In addition,
we exclude apps that do not direct a user to an ad landing page in another activity of other
apps (e.g., Android WebView Shell, or the Play Store app) after a click. We have 6K apps
left after applying these steps.
Note that we also tried the methods in other works [31, 106] to detect ad-hosting apps.
[31] examines click fraud in each app’s first activity. However, we found that around 50%
of the 11.8K packages had sent requests to at least one of the 1,183 ad-related domains, but
no ad was displayed. Those requests may be used for tracking purpose in the first activities
before a user navigates to the next activities that may contain ads. Thus, we cannot apply
the network traffic approach in [31]. We also tried to identify ads by using WebView sizes
in our last step as in [106]. We found that such method is not robust as we identified
more than 300 different WebView sizes from the 11.8K apps’ main activities. For example,
320x50 is a standard CSS size for mobile ads. But we also found ad sizes like 320x49
or 320x51. Also, after conducting ad collection, we finally got mobile ads from 5.7K, or
95.85% of those selected apps.
These 5.7K apps, developed by over 2.5K app developers, exhibit high diversity, in
terms of both app categories1 and number of app downloads (Figure 3.1). Therefore,
we believe that our app dataset is representative. VirusTotal, which aggregates over 60
file/URL scanners, labeled 722 apps within our dataset as suspicious, where 277 of them
were flagged by more than three scanners of VirusTotal.
1It consists of 47 categories, including one app in “Dating” and four apps in “Casino”. Also, categories
with over 300 apps include “Books & References”, “Education”, “Entertainment”, “Lifestyle”, “Music &




















Figure 3.1: Distribution by app downloads
3.2.2 Ad Crawler
As apps running on the AOSP emulators or those provided by Android Studio no longer
get commercial ads but only test ads in case of using ADMOB, we equipped our testbed
with “Custom Phone 7.1.0 (API 25)”, including OPEN GAPPS and ARM TRANSLATION
INSTALLER V1.1, on GENYMOTION [107] 2.11 for personal use. Once GApps is installed,
we get Play Store, and then set “Parental Controls” to the most restrictive level (i.e., “Apps
& games”: Everyone, “Movies”: G, “TV”: C, and restrictions on: “Books” and “Music”)
for making sure that any minor should not be redirected to the installation pages of age-
restricted apps via app install ads. With ARM translator enabled, the X86 architecture,
used by Genymotion, can run most ARM apps.
In order to get mobile ads, ad-supported apps are usually asked to include custom
AdViews, developed by related ad networks. Whereas, our preliminary test with UIAU-
TOMATOR [108] shows that, AdViews’ underlying implementations are mostly based on
WebView. Therefore, we modify and rebuild a WebView (20 LOC in JAVA) from the
CHROMIUM projects (version 63.0.3214.2). We customize the Android WebView by ex-
posing all logcat messages with a specific identifier when using several methods2. Mean-
2Methods include loadUrl(), didFinishLoad(), loadDataWithBaseUrl(),
shouldIgnoreNavigation(), didStopLoading(), shouldInterceptRequest(),
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while, we also use a custom Android WebView Shell (15 LOC in JAVA), which prepends a
specific URL scheme after receiving resolved ad URLs which start with HTTP(S) from a
specific INTENT, from the same source code. As you may know, a URL starting with “fb://”
may be redirected to the Facebook app/website. In our case, the link will be sent and then
resolved within our WebView-based app, named DEPOT, with a single WebView (250 LOC
in JAVA and XML) to take full control (e.g., record all redirections, and take a screenshot).
In order to avoid the pop-up dialog box for selecting a default browser, we only install
the custom Android WebView Shell on the emulator. As for app install ads, once clicked,
most ads will be redirected to Play Store, a few will be handled by the browser, and the rest
starting with “market://” are not resolvable within this experimental one-tab browser.
3.2.3 Automatic Harvest
We develop an automation tool (550 LOC in PYTHON) to drive the testbed and collect
pre-click data. As a preliminary, this tool uses ANDROIDVIEWCLIENT [109] (version
13.6.0), which provides view-based UI interaction, to install sample apps. Following pre-
vious tracks presented in 3.2.1, our tool gets the apps launched. Those running apps display
ads right after every app start. To identify network traffic from a running apps, our tool ob-
serves the identifier, and once seen, it knows that an ad is being received. Thus, it logs
all pre-click URLs and takes an ad screenshot. Afterwards, the module fires touch events
on the ad. It has not escaped our notice that, most ads usually require only one click to
start redirection. But, there are two special situations: 1) Almost all full-screen intersti-
tial ads requires a click on the button with an attractive phrase (e.g., “INSTALL”, “Visit
Site”, “Learn More”, and “Click Now”), and 2) a few banner ads require a button click, but
minimize that button. In case of the banner ad, once tapped, the button enlarges with an
aforementioned phrase. Previous work [57] employs a complex button detection algorithm
to find such buttons. Rather, we collect all button texts and only click these buttons to
didFinishNavigation(), and onTouchEvent().
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navigate into their landing pages.
Two different types (i.e., app install ads, and normal commercial ads) of ad content
end up with different locations for post-click data collection. In case of app install ads,
once clicked, users may be redirected to Play Store. Therefore, the automation tool still
takes care of their post-click data location, including Play Store screenshot and maturity
rating (e.g., Everyone, Teen, Mature 17+), and stores the data from their entire life span
at the same location. But for the moment, we left the ads redirected to Play Store aside.
As for normal commercial ads, we use Depot to collect more information. It takes their
screenshots for the portion we see immediately after the landing pages are fully loaded,
scrapes their full-page HTML content, and records the redirect chains.
Finally, our automation tool stops all launched activities. It is unfortunate that, Depot
cannot identify where a clicked ad comes from (i.e., package name); however, as it takes
at least 30 seconds to record an ad’s entire life span, we can use two time-related records
to link the ad and its landing page, for further analysis. And, we can use external records
to confirm when a package starts and find out the related APK file. Besides, when either
“incapable ad loading” or “improper ad rendering” happens, our tool can also terminate all
launched activities when its watchdog timer gets a timeout. Figure 3.2 depicts our tool’s
workflow for ad collection.
For normal commercial ads, our data consist of three parts:
• Pre-click Data include a set of package name, ad size, ad screenshot, pre-click URLs,
and pre-click time.
• Post-click Data include a set of landing page screenshot, full-page HTML content, URL
redirect chain, and post-click time.
• External Records include a set of APK file name, package name, and starting time.
We finished developing the framework in December, 2017, spent about 6 weeks on
app selection, and then ran 3 non-dedicated machines over a month between mid January
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Figure 3.2: Workflow for data collection
and late February in 2018 at mainly two locations in the United States and one in Canada
with the same Google account to collect mobile ads. During our data collection, in order
to save time, after installing an app, our tool runs the app 10 times before uninstalling it.
Furthermore, an app may be uninstalled in advance, if we encounter totally 3 times of either
“incapable ad loading” or “improper ad rendering”. For data collection, it takes about 32-
45 seconds per cycle, depending on network overload. It is worthy to point out that, our
method is comparably fast [31, 57, 64], since our app dataset helps us eliminate the burden
of complex UI automation, which we believe it is not directly related to mobile ad studies.
Finally, we got nearly 48GB of data, which included over 84K ads.
3.3 Evaluation
After getting a large corpus of mobile ads, we talk about our collected datasets, analyze both
ad-related security topics (click fraud, and malvertising) with the whole data collection, and
explore four interesting case studies involving attacker evolution.
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3.3.1 Datasets
Because the pre-click data and post-click data are collected in two separate apps, we have
to match the two datasets for further analysis. In [31], researchers used a fixed time window
to group all data generated by each Android app. However, we cannot apply a fixed time
window as our data collection time for different apps was variable. Instead, we devise a
heuristic strategy to match pre- and post-click data that belong to the same app. It took
about 32-45 seconds to collect ad-related data for an app in our data collection phase.
Therefore, we gradually increase the window size from 32 seconds to 45 seconds to match
pre-click and post-click data until a match is found. In particular, an entry of the post-click
data should be generated no later than 45 seconds after its pre-click data was generated.
However, we also observe that an ad instance may have more than one landing page due to
landing page redirect, as shown in Figure 3.3a. Such a redirection occurs after the landing
page is loaded. As a result, our tool could collect two post-click records for that ad. In such
cases, we need to match the final landing page with its ad. Thus, for each pair of matched
pre-click and post-click records, we also flag potential final post-click data records that can
be matched with the pre-click data. We then manually verify all such landing page redirect
cases, and rematch the pre-click record with the final record. Finally, we get over 83K
matched ads, including 25,764 ads redirected to Play Store and 57,880 ads landing within
our WebView-based apps. The landing pages collected in our custom app belong to nearly
3.4K advertisers.
The pre-click data that we collect are sometimes not clean. During the ad collection
phase, we encountered a great number of particular cases (e.g., “incapable ad loading”,
and “improper ad rendering”). Other than that, overlapped ads (subsection 3.2.1), a kind
of ad fraud behavior [50], may be another important cause. For example, as shown in
Figure 3.3b, a sample app may satisfy all the criteria we define. It contains a full-screen ad
WebView (red) and another WebView (blue) which is covered by the top ad WebView. The
pre-click data we collected from this app could contain ad traffic of the top ad WebView as
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(a) Landing page redirect (b) Overlapped red and blue ads
Figure 3.3: Special cases encountered during our ad collection
well as background traffic from the blue WebView. We are not able to distinguish the exact
WebView’s URLs from all the labeled network traffic in the pre-click data.
Overall, our pre-click data matched 133 rules in the list of ad-related domains, which
belong to 97 ad networks. For example, Leadbolt uses four different domains (i.e., lead-
bolt.net, leadboltads.net, leadboltmobile.net, and leadboltapps.net). The matched ads in
our pre-click data are in 103 distinct sizes. We collected 58,876 unique redirect chains
in our post-click data. In total, the redirect chains include 203,783 unique URLs. Be-
sides URLs from famous domains (e.g., doubleclick.net, google.com, facebook.com, ama-
zon.com, and yahoo.com), we have still 56,914 URLs for further malvertising analysis.
Last, 96.26% of the 57,880 ads are from Google’s ad networks (i.e., admob.com, and
doubleclick.net). We collect all domains from the pre-click data, and filter out those from
the list of ad-related domains, and we get another list of 710 ad-related domains (e.g., ad
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network, ad analytics, and content delivery network).
3.3.2 Click Fraud
Data Selection. Identifying click fraud is more or less related to detecting fraudulent
app developers and their app packages. Intuitively, since click fraud is an active attack that
automatically redirects webpages, we should only analyze the unmatched post-click data.
However, according to our observation, we also need to consider several cases from the
matched pre-click data. Here is the reason. Usually, a JavaScript snippet is required to
launch automatic clicks within a WebView; yet, ad networks provide their own WebView-
based ADVIEW, which disables the JavaScript API. Therefore, in order to better control the
automation, attackers have to feed ad URLs at their own efforts. According to our settings,
if automatic clicks happen right away at every app start before calling AndroidViewClient’s
dump(), the foreground running task may have already switched to the Depot app, and our
automation tool takes a screenshot as usual. Finally, we may accidentally get landing pages
at both pre- and post-click datasets. Due to the above reason, we must take both situations
into account with different datasets: 1) post-click data from the unmatched collection with
external records, which helps us locate their host apps, and 2) pre-click data from the
matched dataset, which has a 736x992 resolution size, like that in our WebView-based app.
According to the former, we find 356 packages from 575 cases; whereas for the latter, we
get 38 packages from 132 cases. Both situations total 372 unique app packages.
Data Analysis. We take the 372 unique app packages back to our automation tool, but
at this time, we slow down the tool in order to let apps themselves properly trigger click
fraud. Therefore, in case of click fraud, we can get the pre-click screenshots as well, so
that the 736x992 resolution size can be used for sure to identify packages, which initiate
click fraud. Finally, 81 packages meet the criterion. We propose to run such a test recur-
sively until all false positive cases are filtered out. After our manual inspection, we finally
confirm 37 apps, that support click fraud behaviors. Comparing with [31] that finds only
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22 such apps from 165K apps (i.e., 130K from 19 app markets, including Play Store, and
35K malware samples), our study shows the click fraud is still not a well-solved problem.
Surprisingly, one of the seven fraudulent app developers owns 30 out of the 37 apps. After
checking with VirusTotal, we also get three benign apps within them. Afterwards, we fur-
ther look into their network traffic by running our framework again along with logcat. Our
test shows that 1) all positive cases only have three origins, and 2) two of the three sources
are fed by the apps’ local files, including those 30 positively flagged apps. Moreover, we
accidentally find two display fraud packages during manual inspection, where users can
only see their ad banners after navigating back from each landing page from the first click,
but this is beyond the scope of our work.
3.3.3 Malvertising
Similar to [57], we use VirusTotal to examine the 56,914 URLs. In order to fight against
mistaken detection by individual scanning tool, or say, minimize the impact of false pos-
itives, we believe a file/URL to be malicious only if it receives at least three positives.
Otherwise, it is suspicious. We get 1127 positive cases, in which 248 are flagged by at least
three scanners. These 248 URLs are found in 65 unique domains, including 13 sites related
to web tracking, and also resulted in 199 redirect chains. The rest of those 1127 URLs,
flagged by one or two scanners, comes from 147 unique domains, and results in other 669
redirect chains3. Comparing to the findings from [57] in 2016, even though we use less
apps for the experiment and get less links crawled from mobile ads, we find more malver-
tising domains. Therefore, we believe that more hackers are getting into this battlefield,
and the situation related to malvertising has already gotten worse.
The observations in [47, 57], that longer redirect chains are more likely to be malicious,
are more evident in our cases. For the three kinds of redirect chains, we plot their relations
between number and length in Figure 3.4. Accordingly, while only two cases in the clean
3Among these 879 links flagged by less than three scanners, we exclude those URLs appeared in the


























Figure 3.4: Statistics about different types of redirect chains
chains are more than 10 hops, we notice that the length of a malicious chain can even
reach 35 redirections. Afterwards, we zoom in all problematic redirect chains, and plot the
occurrences of every malicious, suspicious, or mixed4 location for both types of unwanted
redirect chains in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6, respectively. Considering [47], unwanted
redirect chains are likely to get more unclean redirects. That’s why Google puts efforts on
stopping those redirects [110]. After examining the problematic redirect chains in detail,
we move towards studying their web content. However, only 32.16% of the malicious, and
64.87% of the suspicious redirect chains have landing pages displayed, including a few app
install ads redirected to our WebView-based app. Moreover, two of the locations where
we collected ads use the Palo Alto Firewall [111], which blocks 26 ad clicks. 14 of these
problematic cases are malicious, and 11 have no redirections. During our ad collection, no
drive-by-download cases are encountered; however, when we examine those malicious ad
links in the web settings, we get a couple of automatic malware downloads. Last, we find
that, 134 APK files generate malicious redirect chains, where 74 are flagged; whereas 263





































































































































































Figure 3.5: Problematic occurrences at each location for 199 malicious redirect chains
APK files generate suspicious redirect chains, where 133 are flagged. As a result, we find
that 168 unique app packages, which get at least one positive from VirusTotal, contribute
to malvertising. Last but not least, we get 92 advertisers from the 199 malicious redirect
chains, and 166 advertisers from the 669 suspicious redirect chains. There are 236 unique
advertisers from malicious or suspicious redirect chains.
3.4 Case Studies
3.4.1 Scam Cases
Although scam cases have been well studied [57], we find new and interesting observations
by looking into their HTML files. Figure 3.7a illustrates the first case, a fake antivirus ad.
Unlike previous findings, we observe that the hacker deceptively implements two buttons
with the same malicious link, as depicted in Figure 3.7c. No matter whether users click
“Install” or “Cancel”, they are redirected to the same malicious link. It reveals that, ad
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Figure 3.6: Problematic occurrences at each location for 669 suspicious redirect chains
(a) Ad with deceptive download (b) Ad with fraudulent reward
(c) Malicious anchored links for the buttons in 3.7a
Figure 3.7: Scam examples
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viewers are more likely to enter a malicious website with such a trick.
Figure 3.7b shows an unexpected prize and lottery scam, which are alleged to offer free
phones. In our dataset, we find two cases with the same image. However, these screen-
shots belong to two different malicious domains (i.e., primerewardz.com and premiumre-
wardsusa.com), with no redirections. Users should prevent from surrendering their private
information, as some scams ask for emails.
3.4.2 Cryptojacking Cases
Here we show two cryptojacking instances. While we discovered over 25 obvious drive-by
cryptomining cases, as seen in Figure 3.8a, we also found 7 subtle examples like that in
Figure 3.8b. The former cases, with up to 9 redirections, are not from a single domain, but
13 different ad domains5. However, all these redirections ended at one of the two websites
(i.e., rcyclmnr.com, and rcyclmnrepv.com). Figure 3.8c shows that the COINHIVE [112]
script was used in Figure 3.8a. We submitted the embedded JavaScript file6 to VirusTotal,
which showed that 33 out of 58 scanners flagged this script as malicious. We later found
out that our discovery was confirmed by both Symantec [113] and Malwarebytes [114].
The latter cases included at most 2 redirections, originated from the same domain (i.e.,
ezanga.com), and landed on dropped-click.com. A closer inspection revealed two interest-
ing tactics used by these developers: 1) the website provides benign links for users to click,
as depicted in Figure 3.8d, and 2) we find three different cryptomining versions within
the website. According to the HTML files, the other two cases were undergoing landing
page redirects; therefore, no further information is for those webpages. One example with
coinhive, two instances with jsecoin.com, and another two cases are with claimers.io, as
depicted in Figure 3.8e. As far as we know, we are the first to find these samples, while no
scanner of VirusTotal has flagged the claimers.io domain as a potential risk yet.
5Domains of the first link in a redirect chain include: leadbolt.net, tc-clicks.com, apperol.com,
shootmedia-hk.com, despiteracy.com, leadzuaf.com, spxtraff.com, smartoffer.site, bestperforming.site, mob-
campaign.site, tracknet.site, topcampaign.site, and ads.gold
6Its SHA-256 is 5d514880ad502302dd4bf0ef8da5d38356385d1c43689f6739f6771ed7a4ef73
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(a) Threatened cryptojacking (b) Deceptive cryptojacking
(c) Drive-by cryptomining script for the campaign in 3.8a
(d) Benign anchored links for antivirus software in 3.8b
(e) Two other cryptomining scripts for the campaign in 3.8b
Figure 3.8: Cryptojacking examples
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We also revisited the 49 apps, from where the aforementioned problematic ad instances
were found. Surprisingly, 21 of the sample apps are benign. Thus, the malvertising cases
found in these apps were resulted solely from untrusted ad networks. Other than that,
fraudulent app developers contribute to the issues as well. We found both of the fraudulent
ad behaviors in the case studies. Specifically, the aforementioned developer, who owns
30 fraudulent apps, has raised our attention again due to the 6 apps among our revisited
samples. The first impression of the developer’s apps is about click fraud: after launching
any of these apps, a user will sometimes be redirected to a landing page with arbitrary
content (e.g., automotive sales, lottery rewards, and pornographic chat rooms). We found
that a local file, named EXIT.HTML, was called in each of the 6 apps. Although the file is
totally clean under VirusTotal, it calls the doStartAppClick() method at every app
start, to automatically trigger a call to visit an ad link7. Ironically, this URL also looks
benign under VirusTotal, but it can serve as an entry point for redirecting users to different
sites, either dirty or clean. We loaded the URL in a browser, and were redirected to a couple
of automatic malware downloading pages8. At the time of this writing, these apps are still
listed on the Play Store, although on January 15th, 2018 the developer changed embedded
ad networks, and then finally disabled the auto click feature.
To sum up, the tricks of fraudulent app developers and of untrusted ad networks are con-
tinuously evolving. They are also not limited to only deceiving users but also developing
new techniques to hijack their computing powers.
3.5 Takeaways
Here we explore if click fraud facilitates the delivery of malvertising. As we mentioned
in 3.2.3, we gave the same opportunity to run each app during our studies, that is, each in-
stalled app runs 10 times unless automatically interrupted 3 times. Afterwards, we employ
7The link, http://pub.reacheffect.com/ra/878/1042/p/m/%7Bcampaign id%7D/CA, has been taken down
in April, 2018.
8Their SHA-256’s are 0c6e40eb1c3b00de1c72f22dec5cffddc3df66672360f79d54d9922c018f4aa6 and
1654cf25365332198c84f7e1e17b237abf0447a97e18800cc349e91cc2eb9a71
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Table 3.1: Malvertising traffic with click fraud
malicious suspicious
no. post-click 199 669
no. pre-click 187 580
no. unmatched post-click 12 89
no. matched pre-click 11 22
percentage 11.56% 16.59%
overall percentage 15.44%
the method presented in 3.3.2 to conduct our analysis, which includes unmatched post-click
data and matched pre-click data.
According to Table 3.1, we get 11.56% of the malicious redirect chains are from click
fraud, and 16.59% of the suspicious redirect chains are form click fraud. Totally, 15.44%
are from the click fraud behaviors, that is, 134 cases related to malvertising.
Finally, we see that these 37 apps with click fraud behaviors totally occur 730 times
in our dataset, that is, a 18.36% chance to initiate malvertising. Whereas, the other 734
malvertising cases occur in the other 82,914 ads, that is, a 0.88% chance of getting mali-
cious ads. Therefore, we can deduce that, due to click fraud, users are 20.86x more likely
to experience malvertising. Although click fraud, initiated by mobile apps, aggravates
malvertising, since ad networks are responsible for the latter, we believe that, ad networks
should take more responsibility to mitigate the situation.
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CHAPTER 4




Figure 4.1: Workflows of in-app billing
In-app billing is flexible for users, which allows a payment agent to coordinate users
with app developers. When opening the in-app billing portal, users may have four options
to make purchases (i.e., add credit or debit cards, add paypal, enable carrier billing, and
redeem gift card). It can even replace app store purchase in the future because of the
“remove ads” option. In-app billing usually offers either consumable (e.g., virtual coins,
props, or cloud storage for one month) or durable (e.g., new game level) digital transactions.
No matter what type of digital purchase a user chooses, the payment workflow behind the
scenes is always conducted via HTTPS, as depicted in Figure 4.1. Basically, users pay
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digital transactions to the related app developers. Afterwards, similar to in-app advertising,
the payment agent takes nearly 30% of the total amount as the commission fee [115].
4.1.2 User Opinions
In order to learn users’ opinions (e.g., user satisfaction) on the two existing app monetiza-
tion models, we conduct a survey with 43 adult volunteers, including students, scholars and
staff, who have basic knowledge of smartphone usage. These respondents, aged from 18 to
45 from 10 countries across 4 continents, are either tech-savvy or lay people. The survey
about user preferences on in-app advertising and in-app billing contains “Yes or No” ques-
tions, multiple choice questions, and open-ended questions. Every participant has signed
the consent form for the current surveys and the subsequent experiments. All user-related
studies were approved by our Institute Review Board (IRB).
Table 4.1 shows user answers towards in-app advertising. While mobile ads in general
mostly receive negative impressions from users, around 20% of the respondents feel com-
fortable with personalized ads. But, none of them are glad to be tracked. Generally, one or
more of the five attitudes is expressed by the participants:
- Accept: “If it’s tailored for me, maybe I’ll click.” (P15)
- Understand: “I understand they’re necessary for the survival of free apps.” (P38)
- Neglect: “I don’t pay attention to mobile ads.” (P43)
- Dislike: “It’s a little bit annoying when ...” (P34)
- Counteract: “I use ad blockers.” (P30)
Moreover, users’ feelings on in-app billing are quite diverse. Table 4.2 shows that less
than 1/3 of the respondents have utilized this monetization service, in which most of their
single transactions are below $5. In-app billing is mainly used to unlock additional content
(e.g., P26 and P30) or remove ads (e.g., P24). Among the users who have never used in-app
billing in our sample, more than 2/3 may not consider the option. These users may “not
trust” the service (e.g., P25) or simply “don’t use apps that require it” (e.g., P9). Also,
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P36 mentions that “I’ve seen a lot of comments about in-app purchases not working and
people losing money”.
As a result, there is potential to improve both of the current monetization services from
two different aspects. In-app advertising may focus on making users feel comfortable,
whereas in-app billing can be used to increase the client pool.
4.1.3 Motivation
When we look into the current monetization services, both models let mobile apps contact
a third-party to initiate the designated service. But in in-app billing, all transactions are
completed on the third-party side (i.e., the payment agent); whereas in in-app advertising,
a fourth-party (i.e., an advertiser) will be selected by the third-party (i.e., the ad network) to
serve ads for end users. While either ad networks or payment agents get a share from what
app developers earn, none of the alternatives carry benefits to end users. Rather, in-app
advertising may antagonize users who disagree with ad-supported apps that track their in-
formation without consent, which may potentially cause harm to the advertised brands. Our
preliminary studies motivate us to come up with a more user-friendly mobile monetization
framework — In-App AdPay, which allows users to query targeted ads by granting permis-
sions at different levels, and receive credits for ad views/clicks. With In-App AdPay, we
furthermore investigate how many credits are associated with every requested permissions.
4.2 Framework
4.2.1 Methodology
The basic idea behind In-App AdPay is to let users get paid with virtual goods after view-
ing/clicking a tailored ad from a selected advertiser. In order to ensure ad personalization,
users have to actively request ads but surrender their private information with consent.
Given that both ad networks and payment agents are essentially brokers, we are able to
combine the two roles into one in In-App AdPay. Moreover, financial incentives motivate
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the app developers to work with every ad network adapting In-App AdPay for securing the
network connections between users and ad networks, although the vast majority of mobile
ads served to ADMOB have been served via HTTPS since 2015 [116]. While money still
flows from advertisers to app developers, users are able to get paid with virtual goods from
app developers. Last, although server redirection is mainly used for reducing connection
speeds, we may still adopt a few client redirections in our design to increase simplicity. It
takes four steps for users to complete such a transaction: 1) after getting into the portal, the
user can select an option, 2) the user must grant the requested permissions to get a tailored
ad, 3) the user can click the ad to get into its landing page, and 4) when the user returns
from the landing page, the payment will automatically be allocated. Figure 4.2 depicts the
flowchart in detail.
Figure 4.2: Workflow of In-App AdPay
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4.2.2 Implementation
According to Figure 4.2, our implementation consists of three NODE.JS servers providing
an app developer, an ad network, and 14 advertisers, respectively, as well as an in-app
user interface with only minimum required features to conduct further experiments. Each
server runs its own MONGODB database and follows the REST architectural style for all
HTTP/HTTPS connections. Also, we consider all advertisers’ simple landing pages are
hosted on the same server without a backend. While the servers are hosted on a Mac
mini with OS X and two PCs (i.e., one with Windows 10 and another with Ubuntu 14.04
Desktop), the user interface is implemented on a Moto X with Android 5.1. All devices are
connected by a switch and a wireless access point within a local network.
In order to complete a transaction, four steps are required: 1) once a user makes an ad
request, the request is logged in the developer’s server and redirected to the ad network’s
server which asks for permissions via the In-App AdPay portal, 2) once the user grants
the permissions, a personalized ad is sent, 3) once the user clicks the ad, a landing page
is rendered, and 4) a payment request is automatically sent and then verified by remote
servers. Also, the first three steps are manually handled by mobile users. Furthermore,
five points are emphasized in our design, as shown in Figure 4.2. First, in step 1d, user
consent is explicitly requested before releasing private information. Second, in steps 1b and
3b, the developer and the ad network log transactions respectively during the redirections.
Afterwards, in steps 2a and 4a, HTTPS connections are used when granting the permissions
to the ad network and when asking for payment from the developer. Moreover, steps 4c and
4d are optional only if the advertiser adapts the CPA model. Finally from step 4b to step 4e,
long polling involves holding the connection open during server-to-server communications
to allow the developer server to respond at a later time.
We include both reasonable-case and worst-case scenarios simultaneously in our im-
plementation. Figure 4.3 depicts the in-app user interface with seven price options between
$0.49 and $3.49. These reasonable prices are set in regards to relatively low revenues that
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Figure 4.3: User interfaces for In-App AdPay
app developers can earn for a single click, since users’ information is worth as much as
advertisers are willing to pay for. When a user clicks on one of the buttons, a dialog box
pops up to request permissions, as shown on the left of Figure 4.3. The higher the pay-
ment asked by the user, the more ad-related permissions that are asked. The ad network
may also explicitly ask users for any permissions that advertisers are interested in – the ex-
ception being Internet and Access Network State, which are only for Internet connectivity.
For the worst case, instead of using permission groups newly adopted in Play Store, we
allow users to see each permission description. After granting the permissions, a randomly
selected 468x60 ad is displayed on the bottom, as shown on the right of Figure 4.3.
4.3 Evaluation
After implementing the framework, we conducted usability testing with 42 volunteers,
which are evenly divided into 7 groups. These participants were asked to repeatedly se-
lect price options and decide whether to grant random Android permissions. All the users’
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2 50 37 white yes idem no
3 50 19 Skype no idem yes
4 50 19 white no idem yes






6 50 19 white no idem yes
7 50 19 white no 1P/B yes
actions and decisions are logged in the background with their consent. After analyzing
the participants’ feedback from a group, we adjusted our test scenario for the next group.
Finally after all tests, we recognize that although user satisfaction rises, users still feel un-
comfortable with information collection. Furthermore, after studying the data from our
evaluators, we identify which permissions users care most about and how users can be
enticed to give advertisers access to them.
4.3.1 Usability Testing & Data Collection
According to [117], five users per usability test is sufficient to assess the framework’s us-
ability. Therefore, for our 42 volunteers, we set six to a group. Each specific test scenario is
conducted in each group. Moreover, for each button, the permissions are randomly selected
with Fisher-Yates shuffle from our database. The seven scenarios and their differences are
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helpful for decision 38
not helpful for decision 4
User
Expectations
Still spend money Yes 20
No 22






shown in Table 4.3.
For Group 1 and Group 2, in order to prevent users from making their decisions in
advance, seven buttons are re-permutated for each round. For the buttons in these two
groups, Button 1 (i.e., $0.49) renders 1 permission, Button 2 (i.e., $0.99) renders 2 permis-
sions, Button 3 (i.e., $1.49) renders 3 permissions, and the other four buttons follow the
same rule. Both groups include 37 permissions, including the 19 permissions discussed in
Section 2.1.3 along with another 18 similar permissions we picked out. Instead of the per-
missions themselves, their official descriptions are displayed in the user interface. While
we start tracking ad clicks from Group 3, we set a blue background with the Skype icon in
Group 3. Group 4 is the same as Group 3 except for the background. Group 5 and Group
6 have the same number of permissions per button in both cases. In Group 7, each button
renders only one permission. All logs are collected within the mobile device. Each log
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consists of which button is clicked, what permissions are requested, time taken to make a
decision, and the decision.
4.3.2 Opinions & Results
After finishing usability tests with 42 volunteers, we conduct a survey related to In-App
AdPay. Table 4.4 depicts user opinions, including perceptions and expectations, related
to our framework. Unsurprisingly, user perceptions were favorable: while more than half
of the evaluators were comfortable with In-App AdPay, over 90% felt comfortable with
advertisers. For example, P2 thinks “it would work for majority of people”, P24 feels that
the service makes every party feel incentive, and P38 points out that it’s a nice idea to get
money from the advertisers in a trade for some personal information as long as the users
is clearly informed of which information is being exchanged. It also shows that nearly 60%
recalled ads and over 80% memorized permissions they have encountered during the test,
and over 90% made decisions according to the permission descriptions. However, we find
that over 70% of the participants are uncomfortable when consenting to collect their private
information. After looking into their comments, we find that:
-P1: “I don’t want to sacrifice my privacy for money.”
-P22: “I think anything more than approximate location is invasive. I like how it gives
clear control of the permissions and how you can “earn” money for virtual transactions.”
-P29: “I was unlikely to agree if I was uncertain of the permission’s impact.”
-P26: “I gave permissions that I thought were okay in keeping my privacy intact. It
is inevitable in our world now. I would not mind as long as I feel that they respect my
privacy to a certain level. I think it is a good experience given that some companies get
these private information from people without paying them anyways.”
We believe that users may not wish to surrender their private information, but everyone
sets prices for different categories of private information. Therefore, we conducted a log
analysis to reveal how users value their private information in different scenarios. The
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Figure 4.4: Individual differences
results will give advertisers a better way to induce users without violating the policies
regarding data privacy. Moreover, all groups have slight differences, except Group 5 and
Group 6 are the same. However, since Group 1 and Group 2 contain permissions not related
to mobile ads, we focus on the other 5 groups.
Individual Differences Individuals do not view privacy uniformly. As used in [118],
we classify our volunteers into three separate clusters: the privacy fundamentalist, the prag-
matic majority, and the marginally concerned. While the privacy fundamentalists find it
extremely unacceptable to give up their private information, the marginally concerned in-
dividuals feel indifferent. The pragmatic majority group falls in the middle. See Figure 4.4.
On the left side, the volunteers with less than 10 “Yes” are considered as the privacy fun-
damentalists and the one with more than 40 “Yes” are treated as the marginally concerned.
Whereas, on the right side, the privacy fundamentalists select less than 6 permissions, but
the marginally concerned people allow more than 16 permissions. We notice that different
settings (i.e., number of permissions per button) trend towards two opposite directions for
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Figure 4.5: Different backgrounds (left: Skype, right: white)
user choices: When users are asked to grant more permissions for higher prices, as shown
in Group 3 and Group 4, “Yes”-related demographics move towards privacy fundamental-
ists in permissions-related demographics. However, when asking for less permissions, as
shown in Group 5 and Group 6, “Yes”-related demographics move towards the marginally
concerned side in permissions-related demographics. As Group 7 asks only one permission
per button, there is no significant difference between “Yes”-related and permissions-related
demographics.
Influences of Trustful Apps Group 3 and Group 4 are the same, except for having
different backgrounds: the volunteers in Group 3 were directed to use a service within
Skype. We consider the null hypothesis (H0a): There is no difference in user satisfaction
with advertisers between Skype background and white background. We quantize user sat-
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isfaction into 5 values (i.e., very comfortable: 1, somewhat comfortable: 0.75, neutral: 0.5,
somewhat uncomfortable: 0.25, and very uncomfortable: 0), and then weight the results
with ad memorization (i.e., still memorized: 1.25, and not memorized: 0.8). We use two
separate sets of unpaired samples for a statistical hypothesis test, in which the test statistic
follows a Student’s t-distribution under the null hypothesis. It can be used with extremely
small sample sizes [119]. An unpaired two-sample t-test shows suggestive evidence that
the null hypothesis does not hold (t=-1.84, p=0.095599, two-tailed). Therefore, we deduce
that users may be more satisfied in using the service within a well-known app like Skype.
As we observe that in Group 3 and Group 4, there are more privacy fundamentalists in
permissions-related than “Yes”-related demographics. We focus on the differences when
using the service within a well-known app like Skype and an unknown app, as depicted
respectively in Figure 4.5. In Group 4, users are more reluctant to click higher paid op-
tions with granting more permissions. As a result, a few permissions do not appear due
to the test’s randomization. However, we cannot find any evident relation between granted
permissions and their CTRs (i.e., ad clicked over ad requested). Therefore, users may be
more satisfied with advertisers by granting more permissions for In-App AdPay within a
well-known app.
Relations between Permissions and Prices/CTRs Group 5 and Group 6 are exactly
the same, which render 1-4 permissions when a button is clicked. Therefore, we consider
the two groups as a whole (i.e., 12 people). As for Group 7, it shows only 1 permission per
button click. In order to evaluate user satisfaction with advertisers in the groups asking for
less permissions, we set Group 4 as the benchmark for the null hypothesis (H0b): There is
no difference in user satisfaction with advertisers when providing different number of per-
missions per button click. The unpaired two-sample t-test (i.e., Group 4 vs. Groups 5&6)
surprisingly fails to reject the null hypothesis (t=-1.71616, p=0.105457, two-tailed), due to
an individual who answers “somewhat uncomfortable” and “not memorized”. When we
exclude this individual’s answers from our sample, there is a significant evidence that the
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Figure 4.6: Number of permissions per button (left: 1-4, right: 1)
null hypothesis does not hold (t=-3.15544, p=0.006539, two-tailed). Therefore, user satis-
faction with advertisers in Groups 5&6 is different from that in Group 4. As for Group 7,
it fails to reject the hull hypothesis (t=-0.03197, p=0.976657, two-tailed) when comparing
with Group 4. Accordingly, three points are highlighted: 1) it’s unavoidable to bring a high
variance into usability testing by extremists, 2) it shows that 1-4 permissions per button
click makes most users satisfied with advertisers, and 3) one permission per button click
does not help increase user satisfaction with advertisers from the original settings in Group
4.
Figure 4.6 shows the CTRs of ad-related permissions in Groups 5&6 and Group 7.
While the CTRs in Figure 4.5 are all above 50%, we witness a more diverse distribution
in Figure 4.6. Specifically, the CTRs of 7 ad-related permissions are below 20% (i.e.,
Send SMS, Read Logs, Change WiFi State, and Write External Storage), and 0% (i.e.,
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Access Fine Location, Write Calendar, and Call Phone) in Group 7. While most permis-
sion rankings in terms of CTR are changed between the two charts in Figure 4.6, Ac-
cess Coarse Location remains first in ranking but gets a higher CTR in Group 7, and the
CTR of Read Calendar keeps within the same range. Since Group 7 allows only one per-
mission per button click, we believe that the CTRs in Group 7 better reflect the actual user
preferences for different ad-related permissions. However, we also deduce that the strategy
of rendering permissions in a combination increases the overall CTRs and gets more user
information.
Table 4.5 displays the median, mean and standard deviation of each permission’s prices
evaluated by the volunteers in Figure 4.6. Similarly, while one permission per button click
in Group 7 may reflect the actual user viewpoints on each permission, the strategy of render-
ing permissions in a combination in Groups 5&6 results in a lower users’ permission-value
expectation, which helps advertisers develop a better approach to allocate their budgets
when using In-App AdPay.
4.4 Takeaways
Our newly proposed monetization service, In-App AdPay, allows advertisers “pay” tar-
geted users for virtual transactions via secure connections. By bringing mobile users into
the monetization loop, we are able to examine how users view advertisers and value per-
missions in different test scenarios. No matter what strategies advertisers use, there are
privacy fundamentalists who always feel very uncomfortable with mobile ads. However,
most volunteers have a positive attitude towards advertisers when using In-App AdPay, es-
pecially with trustful apps. Last, mobile users are likely to share coarse location with oth-
ers, and also grant a few dangerous permissions (e.g., WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE,

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































OTHER CONCERNS RELATED TO DIGITAL ADVERTISING ECOSYSTEMS
5.1 Ad Revenue Stealing Attack
DroidPill, the previously mentioned framework for malware creation, can employ the app
virtualization technique to exploit the advertising ecosystem and steal ad revenue from
benign apps. In order to stay away from legal liabilities, here we do not disclose app
names and ad networks that we tested. Let’s call them app X and ad network Y. The ad
network Y assigns ad unit IDs to app developers when including Y’s SDK in their apps.
When displaying ads, an app supplies its ad unit ID to Y’s ad server, which helps Y map
ads to the developer account. In the experiment, we signed up a developer account and
acquired an ad unit ID from Y. Afterwards, a DroidPill malware was created for app X. By
interposing an API in Y’s SDK, the malware was able to replace the X’s ad unit ID with
the one that Y assigned to us. After displaying/clicking ads in the hacked X for a few days,
we found that our developer account received a small amount of money from Y.
5.2 Ad Inappropriateness
The issue of ad inappropriateness on the Internet has existed for a long time but not yet
fully explored. Legislatures in the United States have enacted various acts (e.g., COPPA,
CIPA [120]) to safeguard children online, including ad views/clicks. Accordingly, well-
known ad networks [6, 121, 122, 123, 124] also establish content policies for advertisers.
But, self regulation is not enough. Therefore, we will take a first step to analyze and classify
inappropriate ad content at large scale.
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We have over 58K post-click records, and each record contains a full page of HTML con-
tent and its landing page screenshot. In order to facilitate our analysis, we need to remove
duplicates from both webpages and screenshots. But, the traditional cryptographic hashing
algorithm cannot perfectly resolve the problem, since a bit difference between two input
files will result in two substantially different hash outputs. For example, the same website
we crawled may contain different cookies. So, we used the CETD algorithm [96] to extract
text content and anchored links from webpages. Finally, we got 12,036 distinct documents.
Also, the same website with a countdown timer may be photo-taken differently at two ad in-
stances. Therefore, in order to retain useful content, we filtered out files with a size less than
15KB. Afterwards, we consecutively employed three image fingerprinting methods [125]
(i.e., wavelet hashing, perception hashing, and difference hashing), which generate similar
output hashes between two cognate input files. Finally, we received 6,337 unique images.
Next, Both Vision API [94] and Natural Language API [95] from Google Cloud are used
to classify 12,036 distinct documents and 6,337 unique images, respectively.
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5.2.2 Severity Classification
Google Cloud Natural Language API reveals the structure and meaning of text from five
different aspects, including sentiment analysis, entity analysis, entity sentiment analysis,
syntactic analysis, and content classification. We used the API to get known entities and
content categories. After identifying documents with the same known entities, we further
reduce duplicate files with a list of the same entities from 12,036 to 7,067. Our selected doc-
uments contain all 27 level-1 categories in [126], and we pick up a few sensitive categories
(i.e., Adult, and Sensitive Subjects). Afterwards, we use known entities to recursively se-
lect the critical categories based on ad policies and public media, and then manually clean
the unrelated documents. Finally, we classify inappropriate ads within the 7,067 dataset
into two severity levels, as presented in Table 5.1:
• prohibited/restricted by ad policies: adult (i.e., pornography), criminal (e.g., record),
cryptocurrency, drug (e.g., cannabis), prize (e.g., fake awards), security (e.g., fake an-
tivirus), store (e.g., age-restricted product)
• controversial: age (e.g., tattoo), cheat (e.g., ASHLEY MADISON), gambling (e.g., casino),
health (e.g., plastic surgery), political (e.g., voting), privacy (e.g., phone number)
Afterwards, we projected all subcategories back to the original dataset. Ad inappro-
priateness in subjective. But, we follow the guidelines based on policies of ad networks
and public opinions to classify those inappropriate ads. For example, AdWords does not
allow “collecting personal information from children under 13 or targeting interest content
to children under the age of 13” [127]; however, the ad network may not know users’ ages.
Therefore, we flag all ads related to age-restricted product. Also, due to Russian agents
used political ads and the Cambridge Analytica scandal, Facebook has received criticism
and modified its policies for political ads [128]. We thus put all such ads into the “public
concerns” category. We get 4577 images for ad policies1, as plotted in Figure 5.1, and 154



















Figure 5.2: Distribution of controversial ads
images for public concerns2 in Figure 5.2.
We also leveraged the Google Vision API, which allows developers to understand the
content of an image by using Google’s machine learning models, on our screenshots to
detect offensive contents and find web entities with similar images. We found the API
performed quite well in detecting pornography. The API was also good at finding similar
images that contain very few characters. For example, a prize wheel image with barely
any characters was flagged as potentially dangerous by the API, because similar images
were found at some malicious websites. However, it was difficult to accurately detect any
other kinds of offensive ad content using the Vision API in general. Thus, we used only the
Natural Language API in our analysis.
2Two categories: age (1.30%), and health (5.19%)
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5.2.3 Case Studies
Unlike the previous two security topics which affect all users, ad inappropriateness may
merely influence minors or all ages. Here we exemplify four cases to show the aggravating
circumstances, as depicted in Figure 5.3. The former two examples are about standalone
contents; the latter two instances show new tricks that advertisers could use to bypass ad
networks’ regulations. Along with their price volatility, cryptocurrencies attract attention
from people all over the world. As a result, the entire industry suddenly booms. During our
ad collection, we get mobile ads of 39 different cryptocurrencies and of 27 cryptocurrency-
related reports from 15 online media. One of such ads, shown in Figure 5.3a, publicizes
its cryptocurrency for the cannabis industry. As we learned from the Internet, marijuana
is not legalized at the federal level in the United States and in Canada [129], such ads
should thus be prohibited. We also found age-restricted content promoted by benign sellers
(e.g., Amazon, and Walmart), as seen in Figure 5.3b. It is even worse that nested ads
can bypass all restrictions. Figure 5.3c illustrates the landing page of a gaming website,
where another two ads are nested. Although ad networks can scrutinize matches between
ads and their landing pages, their arms may not be able to reach at nested ads. To the
best of our knowledge, we do not find any policies to directly regulate such a situation.
As a result, inappropriate ad content may be broadcasted within landing pages subscribed
to well-known ad networks. Here, the rise of this trend is more obvious in Figure 5.3d.
FOFY [130] is a blog website; however, here we consider it as an adware, because: 1) for
more than 30 FOFY ads we collect, only ads are displayed within the screenshots but their
real content hides underneath, and 2) we detect that, these ads are originated from click
fraud. Accordingly, the situation of ad inappropriateness is getting worse.
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(a) Controversial topics in an ad (b) Restricted content on a website
(c) Embedded ads in a landing page (d) Ads within an adware
Figure 5.3: Examples for ad inappropriateness
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5.3 Takeaways
In this chapter, we looked into two different concerns regarding digital advertising. First,
we launched an attack using DroidPill to steal ad revenue, which indicates that app de-
velopers should protect their ad unit IDs. Second, we classified inappropriate ads within
a large-scale dataset into two severity levels. Afterwards, in revealing nested ads, which
can be used to bypass new content-based regulations, within our case studies, we arrive
at the following question for industry: While taking nested ads into consideration, can ad
networks really eliminate inappropriate ads from the ad ecosystem?
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We begin this chapter in 6.1 by revisiting each of the three claims of the thesis statement,
and conclude the dissertation in 6.2 by discussing opportunities for future work in this field.
6.1 Revisiting the Thesis Statement
The following thesis statement was introduced in 1.2:
Secure digital advertising ecosystems will: 1) reduce the occurrences and impacts of
both security issues (i.e., click fraud, and malvertising) to a minimum; 2) harmonize users’
private information surrendered to tracking and customers’ satisfaction towards advertised
brands; and 3) mitigate other ad-related threats (i.e., revenue stealing attack, and content
inappropriateness).
In the following three subsections, we summarize how this dissertation has addressed
each of these three claims.
6.1.1 Security
The first thesis claim was that, secure digital advertising ecosystems will reduce the occur-
rences and impacts of both security issues (i.e., click fraud, and malvertising) to a mini-
mum. We supported the claim in Chapter 3, beginning by selecting 5.7K target apps from
14.3K free apps randomly crawled from Play Store, and then collecting over 84K ads, in-
cluding pre- and post-click data. Afterwards, we conducted analyses related to click fraud
and malvertising, followed by case studies that show a new security threat (i.e., cryptojack-
ing). Furthermore, we recognized that click fraud results in boosting the occurrences of
malvertising. Finally, as we reveal the correlation between these two ad-related security
issues, we suggest that ad networks take more responsibility to mitigate the situation.
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6.1.2 Privacy
The second thesis claim was that, secure digital advertising ecosystems will harmonize
users’ private information surrendered to tracking and customers’ satisfaction towards ad-
vertised brands. We supported the claim in Chapter 4 by implementing a novel monetiza-
tion service — In-App AdPay, which allows users to query targeted ads by granting permis-
sions at different levels, and receives credits for ad views/clicks. After testing usability and
receiving relatively positive feedback from 42 volunteers, we moved on to investigating
how users value permissions in different test scenarios. Except for privacy fundamentalists
who always feel very uncomfortable with mobile ads, most volunteers have a positive at-
titude towards advertisers when using In-App AdPay, especially with trustful apps. Also,
mobile users are likely to share more permissions with advertisers. We believe that a har-
monized ecosystem can thus be achieved.
6.1.3 Other Threats
The final thesis claim was that, secure digital advertising ecosystems will mitigate other
ad-related threats (i.e., revenue stealing attack, and content inappropriateness). We sup-
ported the claim in Chapter 5 by enumerating two dinstinct ad-related threats. First, we
utilized DroidPill to launch ad revenue stealing attack. Second, we classified inappropriate
ad content based on severity level (i.e., prohibited by ad policies, and controversial to the
general public). In this dissertation, we revealed such threats, and recognize that ad net-
works should come up with a solution for such revenue stealing attacks. But, we leave ad
inappropriateness to future work.
6.2 Limitations and Future Work
Although this dissertation talks about a significant contribution we have made to the field
of digital advertising, we do recognize limitations:
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• In Chapter 3, we have two concerns:
We run the experiment on API 25, the latest API level running on Genymotion 2.11.0.
Nowadays, Android 8.1 (API level 27) introduces the safe browsing feature on Web-
View. If ad networks adapt GOOGLE SAFE BROWSING, the malvertising issues could
be somewhat mitigated.
After customizing WebView, we are allowed to track labeled URLs from certain methods
with logcat. But on the one hand, we cannot detect WebViews underneath a full-screen
ad WebView. On the other hand, we are not able to separate each WebView’s logcat
traffic. Therefore, our pre-click data may contain URLs other than those we expect.
• In Chapter 4, three kinds of limitations may occur: experiment-related, technique-
related and human-related.
While In-App AdPay concentrates on mitigating the existing issues of in-app advertising
(e.g., bad impressions on advertisers), it may potentially cause users to neglect in-app
billing’s low price options. Moreover, although it is statistically sufficient to cover dif-
ferent test scenarios with merely 42 volunteers, it would be better to recruit more partici-
pants for in-depth studies for assessing the optimal value of the population’s private data
more precisely.
Two technical issues cannot be resolved by In-App AdPay: (1) click fraud initiated by
app developers, and (2) inappropriate data collection conducted by ad networks. In order
to increase their income, malicious apps may programmatically trick clicks on mobile
ads. Whereas, in our framework, unless the privilege de-escalation for ad libraries is
implemented, ad networks can still request all data granted by app permissions.
Our monetization framework gives users great flexibility to control ad requests. There-
fore, we expect a significant reduction in accidental ad clicks. However, for the sake of
earning “virtual” coins, users may intentionally request and then click ads, which results
in burning advertisers’ budgets. Also, users’ private information (e.g., geolocation) may
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be changed over time. Furthermore, we also find three concerns from users’ comments:
(1) several users (i.e., P3, P8, P27 and P30) do not want their phones out of control until
the service has been trusted, (2) P1 prefers to opt in permissions, and (3) P8 wants to
consider only higher payment and fewer privacy-related permissions.
• In Chapter 5, our work has two limitations:
Google asks that, ads displayed in family apps are expected to be consistent with their
maturity ratings [131]. In [98], authors talk about this issue. However, whether the
parental control settings are on or off, children are able to access all installed apps on a
device. Therefore, our studies only focus on ad inappropriateness in general instead of
with age-restricted apps.
Our content analysis results reply on two public APIs. Admittedly, we cannot measure
the accuracy of these APIs, since we are unable to manually build ground truth for tens
of thousands of webpages and screenshots. Also, unfriendly advertisers are more likely
to use vague expressions; therefore, we expect a fine-grained tool to visually contextu-
ally analyze ads and their landing pages before running online, which also helps reduce
manual scrutiny efforts.
Also, we suggest several opportunities for future work, as follows:
• Exploring More about Ad Safety Issues on Landing Pages — We will move further
towards detecting security breaches related to third-party JavaScript code on landing
pages, and implementing defense mechanism for ad inappropriateness. A lightweight
machine learning approach may be required to classify the content, trustful or doubtful.
Last, the code should reside within WebView, so that the app can automatically raise an
alert or directly kill the tab.
• Usable Privacy for Smartphones and IoT Devices — People usually doubt if sensors,
like webcam and microphone, collect their private information for advertising or other
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purposes. In [132], the vlogger revealed that Chrome displayed relevant ads after he
talked a specific product near the computer. Therefore, I would like to investigate if
these sensors on smartphones and IoT devices track users with no permissions granted,
and also implement countermeasures. A possible solution is different privacy. In [133],
researchers developed the prototype with a differentially private data collection mech-
anism for online avertising, and then evaluated with more than 13K users. We may
conduct such experiments on handheld devices. As we mentioned earlier, mobile envi-
ronments impose more obstacles than online settings; therefore, we expect to face more
technical challenges.
• Online Crime related to E-Commerce, Bitcoin, and Dark Web — Although ad net-
works should take more responsibility on click fraud, we will simultaneously identify
fraudulent publishers. Approaches may include analyzing local files within apps, and
scanning webpages related to every app developer’s email displayed on Play Store. But,
where do these publishers get those illicit URLs? Moreover in [134], researchers re-
vealed that a recently FBI-sized website, Backpage, allowed human traffickers to pay
for posting sex ads with bitcoin. According to the public media, the dark web has more
hidden services with unlawful transactions using cryptocurrencies, like bitcoin. The law
enforcement agencies, such as the FBI, put a lot of effot into tracking these crimes. In
consideration of both questions, we will use a variety of techniques (e.g., data collection,
machine learning, and natural language processing), and go deep into the dark web for
finding out the answers.
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the network and user-targeting properties of web advertising networks,” ICDCS,
2011.
[17] W. Enck, P. Gilbert, B. Chun, L. Cox, J. Jung, P. McDaniel, and A. Sheth, “Taint-
droid: An information-flow tracking system for realtime privacy monitoring on
smartphones,” OSDI, 2010.
[18] M. Egele, C. Kruegel, E. Kirda, and G. Vigna, “Pios: Detecting privacy leaks in ios
applications,” NDSS, 2011.
[19] W. Enck, D. Octeau, P. McDaniel, and S. Chaudhuri, “A study of android applica-
tion security,” Sec, 2011.
[20] Android permissions, https : / / developer . android . com / guide /
topics/permissions/overview, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[21] Ios security, https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_
Guide.pdf, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[22] 12 most abused android app permissions, http://about-threats.trendmicro.
com/us/library/image-gallery/12-most-abused-android-
app-permissions, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[23] I. Leontiadis, C. Efstratiou, M. Picone, and C. Mascolo, “Don’t kill my ads!: Bal-
ancing privacy in an ad-supported mobile application market,” HotMobile, 2012.
77
[24] D. Davidson and B. Livshits, “Morepriv: Mobile os support for application person-
alization and privacy,” Technical report, Microsoft Research, Tech. Rep. 163596,
2012.
[25] A. Khan, K. Jayarajah, D. Han, A. Misra, R. Balan, and S. Seshan, “Cameo: A
middleware for mobile advertisement delivery,” MobiSys, 2013.
[26] T. Book, A. Pridgen, and D. Wallach, “Longitudinal analysis of android ad library
permissions,” arXiv, vol. 1303.0857,
[27] S. Shekhar, M. Dietz, and D. Wallach, “Adsplit: Separating smartphone advertising
from applications,” Sec, 2012.
[28] R. Stevens, C. Gibler, J. Crussell, J. Erickson, and H. Chen, “Investigating user
privacy in android ad libraries,” MoST, 2012.
[29] T. Book and D. Wallach, “A case of collusion: A study of the interface between ad
libraries and their apps,” SPSM, 2013.
[30] ——, “An empirical study of mobile ad targeting,” arXiv, vol. 1502.06577,
[31] J. Crussell, R. Stevens, and H. Chen, “Madfraud: Investigating ad fraud in android
applications,” MobiSys, 2014.
[32] S. Nath, “Madscope: Characterizing mobile in-app targeted ads,” MobiSys, 2015.
[33] B. Liu, B. Liu, H. Jin, and R. Govindan, “Efficient privilege de-escalation for ad
libraries in mobile apps,” MobiSys, 2015.
[34] Mobile rich media ad interface definition (mraid), https://www.iab.com/
wp-content/uploads/2017/07/MRAID_3.0_FINAL.pdf, [Online;
accessed June-2018].
[35] B. Miller, P. Pearce, C. Grier, C. Kreibich, and V. Paxson, “What’s clicking what?
techniques and innovations of today’s clickbots,” DIMVA, 2011.
[36] P. Pearce, V. Dave, C. Grier, K. Levchenko, S. Guha, D. McCoy, V. Paxson, S. Sav-
age, and G. Voelker, “Characterizing large-scale click fraud in zeroaccess,” CCS,
2014.
[37] V. Dave, S. Guha, and Y. Zhang, “Measuring and fingerprinting click-spam in ad
networks,” SIGCOMM, 2012.
[38] H. Haddadi, “Fighting online click-fraud using bluff ads,” Computer Communica-
tions Review, vol. 40, 2 2010.
78
[39] L. Zhang and Y. Guan, “Detecting click fraud in pay-per-click streams of online
advertising networks,” ICDCS, 2008.
[40] V. Dave, S. Guha, and Y. Zhang, “Viceroi: Catching click-spam in search ad net-
works,” CCS, 2013.
[41] B. Stone-Gross, R. Stevens, A. Zarras, R. Kemmerer, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna,
“Understanding fraudulent activities in online ad exchanges,” IMC, 2011.
[42] B. Viswanath, M. Bashir, M. Crovella, S. Guha, K. Gummadi, B. Krishnamurthy,
and A. Mislove, “Towards detecting anomalous user behavior in online social net-
works,” Sec, 2014.
[43] S. Alrwais, C. Dunn, M. Gupta, A. Gerber, O. Spatscheck, and E. Osterweil, “Dis-
secting ghost clicks: Ad fraud via misdirected human clicks,” ACSAC, 2012.
[44] T. Moore, N. Leontiadis, and N. Christin, “Fashion crimes: Trending-term exploita-
tion on the web,” CCS, 2011.
[45] T. Moore and B. Edelman, “Measuing the perpetrators and funders of typosquat-
ting,” FC, 2010.
[46] A. Zarras, A. Kapravelos, G. Stringhini, T. Holz, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna, “The
dark alleys of madison avenue: Understanding malicious advertisements,” IMC,
2014.
[47] Z. Li, K. Zhang, Y. Xie, F. Yu, and X. Wang, “Knowing your enemy: Understanding
and detecting malicious web advertising,” CCS, 2012.
[48] H. Mekky, R. Torres, Z. Zhang, S. Saha, and A. Nucci, “Detecting malicious http
redirections using trees of user browsing activity,” INFOCOM, 2014.
[49] D. Wigdor, C. Forlines, P. Baudisch, J. Barnwell, and C. Shen, “Lucidtouch: A
see-through mobile device,” UIST, 2007.
[50] B. Liu, S. Nath, R. Govindan, and J. Liu, “Decaf: Detecting and characterizing ad
fraud in mobile apps,” NSDI, 2014.
[51] M. Dietz, S. Shekhar, Y. Pisetsky, A. Shu, and D. Wallach, “Quire: Lightweight
provenance for smart phone operating systems,” Sec, 2011.
[52] F. Roesner and T. Kohno, “Securing embedded user interfaces: Android and be-
yond,” Sec, 2013.
79
[53] Report: 40accidental, https://marketingland.com/report-40-of-
clicks- on- mobile- ads- are- fraudulent- or- accidental-
20646, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[54] X. Zhang, A. Ahlawat, and W. Du, “Aframe: Isolating advertisements from mobile
applications in android,” ACSAC, 2013.
[55] M. Grace, W. Zhou, X. Jiang, and A.-R. Sadeghi, “Unsafe exposure analysis of
mobile in-app advertisements,” WiSec, 2012.
[56] Y. Zhou, Z. Wang, W. Zhou, and X. Jiang, “Hey, you, get off of my market: Detect-
ing malicious apps in official and alternative android markets,” NDSS, 2012.
[57] V. Rastogi, R. Shao, Y. Chen, X. Pan, S. Zou, and R. Riley, “Are these ads safe:
Detecting hidden attacks through the mobile app-web interfaces,” NDSS, 2016.
[58] F. Roesner, T. Kohno, and D. Wetherall, “Detecting and defending against third-
party tracking on the web,” NSDI, 2012.
[59] J. Mayer and J. Mitchell, “Third-party web tracking: Policy and technology,” IEEE
Security and Privacy (Oakland), 2012.
[60] G. Merzdovnik, M. Huber, D. Buhov, N. Nikiforakis, S. Neuner, M. Schmiedecker,
and E. Weippl, “Block me if you can: A large-scale study of tracker-blocking tools,”
Euro S&P, 2017.
[61] P. Barford, I. Canadi, D. Krushevskaja, Q. Ma, and S. Muthukrishnan, “Adscape:
Harvesting and analyzing online display ads,” WWW, 2014.
[62] I. Kim, W. Wang, Y. Kwon, Y. Zheng, Y. Aafer, W. Meng, and X. Zhang, “Adbud-
getkiller: Online advertising budget draining attack,” WWW, 2018.
[63] P. Gill, V. Erramilli, A. Chaintreau, B. Krishnamurthy, D. Papagiannaki, and P.
Rodriguez, “Follow the money: Understanding economics of online aggregation
and advertising,” IMC, 2013.
[64] S. Nath, F. Lin, L. Ravindranath, and J. Padhye, “Smartads: Bringing contextual
ads to mobile apps,” MobiSys, 2013.
[65] A. Korolova, “Privacy violations using microtargeted ads: A case study,” ICDMW,
2010.
[66] S. Guha, B. Cheng, and P. Francis, “Challenges in measuring online advertising
systems,” IMC, 2010.
80
[67] C. Castelluccia, M. Kaafar, and M. Tran, “Betrayed by your ads!: Reconstructing
user profiles from targeted ads,” PETS, 2012.
[68] S. Guha, B. Cheng, and P. Francis, “Privad: Practical privacy in online advertising,”
NSDI, 2011.
[69] V. Toubiana, A. Narayanan, D. Boneh, H. Nissenbaum, and S. Barocas, “Adnostic:
Privacy preserving targeted advertising,” NDSS, 2010.
[70] M. Fredrikson and B. Livshits, “Repriv: Re-imagining content personalization and
in-browser privacy,” IEEE Security and Privacy (Oakland), 2011.
[71] G. Portokalidis, M. Polychronakis, A. Keromytis, and E. Markatos, “Privacy-preserving
social plugins,” Sec, 2012.
[72] M. Mughees, Z. Qian, Z. Shafiq, K. Dash, and P. Hui, “A first look at ad-block
detection — a new arms race on the web,” arXiv, vol. 1605.05841,
[73] U. Iqbal, Z. Shafiq, and Z. Qian, “The ad wars: Retrospective measurement and
analysis of anti-adblock filter lists,” IMC, 2017.
[74] S. Zhu, X. Hu, Z. Qian, Z. Shafiq, and H. Yin, “Measuring and disrupting anti-
adblockers using differential execution analysis,” NDSS, 2018.
[75] X. Wei, L. Gomez, L. Neamtiu, and M. Faloutsos, “Profiledroid: Multi-layer pro-
filing of android applications,” MobiCom, 2012.
[76] S. Han, J. Jung, and D. Wetherall, “A study of third-party tracking by mobile apps
in the wild,” Technical report, University of Washington, Tech. Rep. UW-CSE-12-
03-01, 2012.
[77] A. Razaghpanah, R. Nithyanand, N. Vallina-Rodriguez, S. Sundaresan, M. Allman,
C. Kreibich, and P. Gill, “Apps, trackers, privacy, and regulators: A global study of
the mobile tracking ecosystem,” NDSS, 2018.
[78] X. Wei, L. Gomez, L. Neamtiu, and M. Faloutsos, “Permission evolution in the
android ecosystem,” ACSAC, 2012.
[79] S. Son, D. Kim, and V. Shmatikov, “What mobile ads know about mobile users,”
NDSS, 2016.
[80] S. Demetriou, W. Merrill, W. Yang, A. Zhang, and C. Gunter, “Free for all! assess-
ing user data exposure to advertising libraries on android,” NDSS, 2016.
81
[81] W. Meng, R. Ding, S. Chung, S. Han, and W. Lee, “The price of free: Privacy
leakage in personalized mobile in-apps ads,” NDSS, 2016.
[82] P. Pearce, A. Felt, G. Nunez, and D. Wagner, “Addroid: Privilege separation for
applications and advertisers in android,” ASIACCS, 2012.
[83] P. Hornyack, S. Han, J. Jung, S. Schechter, and D. Wetherall, “These aren’t the
droids you’re looking for: Retrofitting android to protect data from imperious ap-
plications,” CCS, 2011.
[84] H. Haddadi, P. Hui, and I. Brown, “Mobiad: Private and scalable mobile advertis-
ing,” MobiArch, 2010.
[85] E. Palme, B. Hess, and J. Sutanto, “Achieving targeted mobile advertisements while
respecting privacy,” MobiCASE, 2012.
[86] M. Hardt and S. Nath, “Privacy-aware personalization for mobile advertising,”
CCS, 2012.
[87] D. Barrera, H. Kayacik, P. van Oorschot, and A. Somayaji, “A methodology for
empirical analysis of permission-based security models and its application to an-
droid,” CCS, 2010.
[88] M. Backes, S. Bugiel, P. von Styp-Rekowsky, and M. Wißfeld, “Seamless in-app
ad blocking on stock android,” MoST, 2017.
[89] W. Meng, X. Xing, A. Sheth, U. Weinsberg, and W. Lee, “Your online interests -
pwned! a pollution attack against targeted advertising,” CCS, 2014.
[90] K. Thomas, E. Bursztein, C. Grier, G. Ho, N. Jagpal, A. Kapravelos, D. McCoy,
A. Nappa, V. Paxson, P. Pearce, N. Provos, and M. A. Rajab, “Ad injection at
scale: Assessing deceptive advertisement modifications,” IEEE Security and Pri-
vacy (Oakland), 2015.
[91] M. Backes, S. Bugiel, C. Hammer, O. Schranz, and P. von Styp-Rekowsky, “Box-
ify: Full-fledged app sandboxing for stock android,” Sec, 2015.
[92] A. Bianchi, Y. Fratantonio, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna, “Njas: Sandboxing unmodi-
fied applications in non-rooted devices running stock android,” SPSM, 2015.
[93] W. Meng, B. Lee, X. Xing, and W. Lee, “Trackmeornot: Enabling flexible control
on web tracking,” WWW, 2016.
[94] Google cloud vision api, https://cloud.google.com/vision/, [Online;
accessed June-2018].
82
[95] Google cloud natural language api, https://cloud.google.com/natural-
language/, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[96] F. Sun, D. Song, and L. Liao, “Dom based content extraction via text density,”
SIGIR, 2011.
[97] Ui/application exerciser monkey, https://developer.android.com/
studio/test/monkey.html, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[98] Y. Chen, S. Zhu, H. Xu, and Y. Zhou, “Children’s exposure to mobile in-app adver-
tising: An analysis of content appropriateness,” SocialCom, 2013.
[99] A. Felt, S. Egelman, M. Finifter, D. Akhawe, and D. Wagner, “How to ask for
permission,” HotSec, 2012.
[100] A. Felt, E. Ha, S. Egelman, A. Haney, E. Chin, and D. Wagner, “Android permis-
sions: User attention, comprehension, and behavior,” SOUPS, 2012.
[101] P. Kelley, L. Cranor, and N. Sadeh, “Privacy as part of the app decision-making
process,” CHI, 2013.
[102] A. Felt, S. Egelman, and D. Wagner, “I’ve got 99 problems, but vibration ain’t one:
A survey of smartphone users’ concerns,” SPSM, 2012.
[103] Z. Jorgensen, J. Chen, C. Gates, N. Li, R. Proctor, and T. Yu, “Dimensions of risk
in mobile applications: A user study,” CODASPY, 2015.
[104] Adaway, https://adaway.org/hosts.txt, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[105] Adguard mobile ads filter, https://filters.adtidy.org/windows/
filters/11.txt?id=11, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[106] F. Dong, H. Wang, Y. Li, Y. Guo, L. Li, S. Zhang, and G. Xu, “Fraudroid: An
accurate and scalable approach to automated mobile ad fraud detection,” arXiv,
vol. 1709.01213,
[107] Genymotion, https://www.genymotion.com, [Online; accessed June-
2018].
[108] Ui automator, https://developer.android.com/training/testing/
ui-automator, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[109] Android viewserver client, https://github.com/dtmilano/AndroidViewClient,
[Online; accessed June-2018].
83
[110] Chrome declares war on unwanted redirects, https://blog.malwarebytes.
com/cybercrime/2017/11/chrome-declares-war-unwanted-
redirects/, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[111] Palo alto firewall, http://www.paloalto-firewalls.com, [Online;
accessed June-2018].
[112] Coinhive, https://coinhive.com, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[113] Browser-based cryptocurrency mining makes unexpected return from the dead,
https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat- intelligence/
browser-mining-cryptocurrency, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[114] Drive-by cryptomining campaign targets millions of android users, https://
blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2018/02/drive-
by-cryptomining-campaign-attracts-millions-of-android-
users/, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[115] Transaction fees, https://support.google.com/googleplay/android-
developer/answer/112622?hl=en, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[116] Https everywhere, http://doubleclickadvertisers.blogspot.com/
2015/04/ads-take-step-towards-https-everywhere.html,
[Online; accessed June-2018].
[117] How many test users in a usability study? https://www.nngroup.com/
articles/how-many-test-users/, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[118] M. Ackerman, L. Cranor, and J. Reagle, “Privacy in e-commerce: Examining user
scenarios and privacy preferences,” EC, 1999.
[119] J. D. Winter, “Using the student’s t-test with extremely small sample sizes,” PARE,
2013.
[120] Children’s internet protection act, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/
guides/childrens-internet-protection-act, [Online; accessed
June-2018].
[121] Adwords policies, https://support.google.com/adwordspolicy,
[Online; accessed June-2018].
[122] Ad policies, https://support.google.com/youtube/topic/30084?
hl=en&ref_topic=2972865, [Online; accessed June-2018].
84
[123] Advertising policies, https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/,
[Online; accessed June-2018].
[124] Prohibited content policies, https : / / business . twitter . com / en /
help/ads-policies/prohibited-content-policies.html, [On-
line; accessed June-2018].
[125] A image hashing library written in python, https://github.com/JohannesBuchner/
imagehash, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[126] Content categories, https://cloud.google.com/natural-language/
docs/categories, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[127] Personalized advertising, https://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/
answer/143465?hl=en, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[128] Facebook announces major changes to political ad policies, https://www.
nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/facebook-announces-major-
changes-political-ad-policies-n863416, [Online; accessed June-
2018].
[129] Legality of cannabis by country, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Legality_of_cannabis_by_country, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[130] Fofy, https://www.fofy.com, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[131] Parent guide to google play, https://support.google.com/googleplay/
answer/6209547?hl=en, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[132] Is google always listening: Living test, https : / / www . youtube . com /
watch?v=zBnDWSvaQ1I, [Online; accessed June-2018].
[133] A. Reznichenko and P. Francis, “Private-by-design advertising meets the real world,”
CCS, 2014.
[134] R. Portnoff, D. Huang, P. Doerfler, S. Afroz, and D. McCoy, “Backpage and bit-
coin: Uncovering human traffickers,” KDD, 2017.
85
